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A SLOW MARCH TOWARDS THOUGHT 
CRIME:  HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY’S FAST PROGRAM 
VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
CHRISTOPHER A. ROGERS 
The United States Government is currently developing a system that can 
read minds—a situation that George Orwell envisioned when he wrote 
Nineteen Eighty-Four.  The Future Attribute Screening Technology 
(“FAST”), currently being tested by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), employs a variety of sensor suites to scan a person’s vital signs, and 
based on those readings, to determine whether the scanned person has 
“malintent”—the intent to commit a crime. 
FAST is currently designed for deployment at airports, where heightened 
security threats justify warrantless searches under the administrative search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment.  FAST scans, however, exceed the scope of 
the administrative search exception.  Under this exception, the courts would 
employ a balancing test, weighing the governmental need for the search versus 
the invasion of personal privacy of the search, to determine whether FAST 
scans violate the Fourth Amendment.  Although the government has an acute 
interest in protecting the nation’s air transportation system against terrorism, 
FAST is not narrowly tailored to that interest because it cannot detect the 
presence or absence of weapons but instead detects merely a person’s frame of 
mind.  Further, the system is capable of detecting an enormous amount of the 
                                                          
   Associate Managing Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 64; J.D. 
Candidate, May 2015, American University Washington College of Law; B.A. History, 
February 2010, Middlebury College.  I am sincerely grateful to the editors and staff of 
the American University Law Review for their work in making this Comment possible 
and to Professor Cynthia Jones who set me down the right track.  I would also like to 
thank my friends and family—especially Elizabeth Rogers—whose constant support 
and encouragement made this process that much easier.  All errors and mistakes are 
the author’s own. 
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scannee’s highly sensitive personal medical information, ranging from 
detection of arrhythmias and cardiovascular disease, to asthma and 
respiratory failures, physiological abnormalities, psychiatric conditions, or even 
a woman’s stage in her ovulation cycle.  This personal information warrants 
heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment.  Rather than target all 
persons who fly on commercial airplanes, the Department of Homeland 
Security should limit the use of FAST to where it has credible intelligence that a 
terrorist act may occur and should place those people scanned on prior notice 
that they will be scanned using FAST. 
Finally, if the Department of Homeland Security deploys FAST in a 
Minority Report-like approach by using it to detect a person’s intent to 
commit ordinary crimes—such as murder, theft, or drug smuggling—FAST 
does not fall under the administrative search requirement and must meet the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement or another exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
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It was terribly dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you 
were in any public place or within range of a telescreen.  The 
smallest thing could give you away.  A nervous tic, an unconscious 
look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself—anything that 
carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having something 
to hide. . . . Your worst enemy, he reflected, was your nervous 
system.  At any moment the tension inside you was liable to translate 
itself into some visible symptom. 
- George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four1 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 15, 2013, three people died and hundreds were wounded 
when two homemade pressure cooker bombs exploded near the 
finish line of the Boston Marathon.2  Employing images taken from 
security cameras, the Federal Bureau of Investigation identified two 
men as persons of interest and possible suspects because their images 
appeared near the blast zones moments before the bombs went off.3  
Prior to the explosions, no one suspected that Tamerlan and 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev were about to detonate two improvised explosive 
devices in the crowded area around the finish line of the Boston 
Marathon.4  However, over the next few years, the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) is hoping to deploy a system in America 
that would be able to detect the signs of agitation that precede 
such criminal acts—crime detection before the crime is even 
committed.5  The system—Future Attribute Screening Technology 
(“FAST”)—can remotely read a person’s vital signs and then predict 
                                                          
 1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 71, 73 (Penguin Books 1987) (1949). 
 2. Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/ 
03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts (last updated Nov. 1, 2014, 5:06 PM). 
 3. What We Know About the Boston Bombing and Its Aftermath, CNN, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/04/18/us/boston-marathon-things-we-know (last 
updated Apr. 18, 2013, 9:54 AM). 
 4. See Jonathan Allen, Factbox:  Charges Filed Against Boston Marathon Bombing 
Suspect, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ 
04/22/us-usa-explosions-boston-complaint-idUSBRE93L16C20130422 (showing that 
the Tsarnaev brothers were acting relatively normal prior to the blasts). 
 5. See Michael Solomon, Uncle Sam’s “Mal-intent”:  With Its FAST Program, the 
Federal Government Is Trying to Read Minds to Fight Terrorism, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2011), http://inthesetimes.com/article/12408/uncle_sams_mal_intent (positing 
that Future Attribute Screening Technology (“FAST”) Mobile Modules “may one day 
roam the country” to predict if people will commit crimes). 
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whether that person has the indicators of “malintent,” the intention 
to commit a crime.6 
FAST implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches because it would allow the government to 
obtain vast quantities of sensitive medical data from the people 
scanned.  This Comment argues that the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits DHS from using FAST scans to detect ordinary crimes 
without first securing a warrant based on probable cause.  It further 
argues that the use of FAST—in its current form without limitation—
to detect terrorism at airports and high-profile venues is an 
unreasonable administrative search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.  These scans are not minimally intrusive because they 
can obtain highly sensitive medical data, and the scans are not 
narrowly tailored to detect weapons or explosives because they are 
designed to detect a frame of mind. 
Part I of this Comment describes the FAST system and its 
functions.  Part II discusses the applicable Fourth Amendment 
framework and the requirements for a reasonable administrative 
search, while Part III describes a person’s privacy interest in medical 
data as implicated by FAST’s conceivable ability to uncover medical, 
psychiatric, and other conditions through the scans.  Part IV then 
demonstrates that a FAST scan is a Fourth Amendment search but 
that it meets the criteria to be analyzed under the administrative 
search exception to the warrant requirement.  This Part further 
analyzes the reasonableness of FAST scans under administrative 
search jurisprudence and ultimately concludes that FAST scans are 
not reasonable under the administrative search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment and are therefore invalid.  Specifically, FAST is 
too intrusive due to its potential to reveal sensitive medical data, and 
that its intrusiveness is not outweighed by the governmental interest 
in preventing terrorist acts because FAST scans are not narrowly 
tailored to further that governmental interest. 
                                                          
 6. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FAST:  FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY 4 
(2010) [hereinafter DHS FAST PRESENTATION], available at http://epic.org/privacy/ 
fastpresentation.pdf (defining malintent as “[t]he mental state of individuals 
intending to cause harm to our citizens or our infrastructure”). 
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING 
TECHNOLOGY 
A. How FAST Works 
The FAST system is grounded in research on human behavior and 
psychophysiology, relying on the theory that the body’s autonomic 
nervous system reacts in certain ways and that, when those reactions 
are detected, the system can reveal a person’s intentions.7  The theory 
is based on an evolution of the polygraph:  scientists have long known 
that changes in heart rate, blood pressure, and galvanic skin response 
are indicators that a person is lying.8  Although a skilled liar can train 
herself to “appear honest,” certain bodily functions, such as blinking, 
are controlled by the autonomic nervous system and cannot be 
consciously controlled.9  FAST is designed to remotely detect these 
indices and determine whether a person has malintent.10  While the 
public often believes that this type of technology is a figment of 
science fiction as in the movie Minority Report11 or George Orwell’s 
novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, the underlying theory is already employed 
in the legal world.12  Behavioral detection is commonly used in the 
courtrooms because juries subconsciously judge the veracity of a 
witness’s statements according to the witness’s demeanor on the 
                                                          
 7. Steven Cherry & Anne-Marie Corley, Bad Vibes:  A Quixotic U.S. Government 
Security System Seeks to Look into Your Soul, IEEE SPECTRUM, Jan. 2010, at 60, 61; see also 
Marcus Holmes, National Security Behavioral Detection:  A Typography of Strategies, Costs, 
and Benefits, 4 J. TRANSP. SECURITY 361, 364–67 (2011) (claiming that even though 
people can train themselves to look as if they are not lying, certain overt body 
functions cannot be controlled and can indicate emotional arousal). 
 8. Carol Eisenberg, Homeland Security Exploring Mass-Scanning System, 
MCCLATCHY-TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Aug. 15, 2007; see Holmes, supra note 7, at 366 
(asserting that traditional polygraphs measure the variation in responses to answers 
based on blood pressure, respiration, heart rate, and skin conductivity 
measurements).  Lie detector results “are not admissible in a court of law because of 
questions about their accuracy.”  Eisenberg, supra. 
 9. Holmes, supra note 7, at 365. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 117–26 (explaining how FAST is designed 
to remotely monitor individuals’ physiological data). 
 11. MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth Century Fox 2002). 
 12. Holmes, supra note 7, at 371 (“Legal studies scholars have investigated the 
effect of non-verbal cues as the testimony of witnesses and judges over the past few 
decades and have determined that the mere appearance of a witness, defendant, or 
attorney can have a salient effect on judicial outcomes.”).  Casinos have used infrared 
cameras to detect cheaters for years because cheating causes a person’s body 
temperature to rise.  Cath Everett, Biometrics-Based Surveillance:  Big Brother or Vital 
Safeguard?, COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY, Nov. 2009, at 5, 6. 
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stand; accordingly, experts often coach witnesses on how to act and 
dress on the stand to increase their believability.13  Additionally, DHS 
has a long-standing behavioral detection program, currently used in 
airports, where trained agents visually identify cues of malintent.14 
Although biometric devices are usually considered only in science 
fiction, the government is already employing “biometric devices that 
can strip a person bare on a cellular level,” which can be more 
intrusive than a public strip search.15  As history has shown, what was 
once science fiction can readily become reality, and constitutional 
scholars believe that soon the “nascent” technologies currently 
deployed by the government will be integrated “into a complex, 
interwoven cyber network aimed at tracking our movements, 
predicting our thoughts, and controlling our behavior.”16 
The National Academy of Sciences disagrees with the polygraph 
theory that underlies the FAST theory, noting that its own meta-
analysis of polygraph research demonstrates that polygraphs are 
                                                          
 13. Holmes, supra note 7, at 371 (“If, as these studies suggest, juries do rely on 
nonverbal behavior more than verbal content in making judgments, the accuracy of 
their interpretations of such nonverbal behavior might be crucial to the outcome of 
the case. . . .  The jury’s ability to interpret will often be tested when the jury trie[s] 
to determine whether a witness, client, or attorney is deceiving [it].”). 
 14. See generally Justin Florence & Robert Friedman, Profiles in Terror:  A Legal 
Framework for the Behavioral Profiling Paradigm, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423, 425–30 
(2010) (describing DHS’s use of a behavioral profiling program that focuses on 
analyzing subtle human expressions and behavior as a security measure); infra notes 
51–53 and accompanying text. 
 15. John W. Whitehead, Upending Human Dignity and Shattering the Fourth 
Amendment:  Strip Searches, HUM. RTS. MAG., May 2013, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2013_vo
l_39/may_2013_n2_privacy/upending_human_dignity_fourth_amendment.html. 
 16. Id.  Businesses use eye trackers, a type of biometric screening, to track where 
people look and to increase the effectiveness of advertisements.  What Is Eye 
Tracking?, TOBII, http://www.tobii.com/en/about/what-is-eye-tracking (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2014).  However, data-gathering is not limited to the business realm, as seen 
by the recent controversy with the National Security Agency, and although DHS 
needs to work out many “kinks” with FAST, the federal government is using 
advanced analytic technologies to detect and prevent crime.  Yaniv Mor, Big Data and 
Law Enforcement:  Was “Minority Report” Right?, WIRED (Mar. 5, 2014, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/03/big-data-law-enforcement-minority-report-right; see 
also Dave Lee, New Adverts “Could Track Your Eyes” in Supermarkets, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22351995 (last updated Apr. 30, 2013, 12:13 
PM) (reporting that researchers at Lancaster University have created an eye tracking 
device that can easily detect separate users and that eye tracking technology will soon 
become “widely available”).  “As technologies evolve, so too will the 
processes . . . used to capture bad guys.”  Mor, supra. 
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“[u]nreliable, [u]nscientific and [b]iased.”17  Polygraph critics note 
that there is not a clear link between deception and physiological 
responses.18  Specifically, polygraphs measure indices that can vary by 
the minute for non-deceptive reasons, and some studies have shown 
that stress can have an inordinate amount of influence on these 
factors.19  Polygraphs are also highly susceptible to countermeasures, 
such as when people control their breathing during hard questions 
and breathe hard during control questions.20 
Compared to polygraphs, FAST measures similar indices and 
detects the variations between responses, which DHS’s theory 
suggests will illuminate deception.21  Proponents of FAST note that it 
is designed to correct the problems that plague polygraphs by 
focusing on signs of malintent rather than on signs of deception.22  
They argue that comparing FAST to polygraphs is immature and that 
FAST’s accuracy rates “are almost certainly higher than actual 
polygraph accuracy.”23  Specifically, proponents argue that FAST 
“focuses on many more measures of the autonomic nervous system, 
and it has already had success in being able to detect different 
emotional states,” thus increasing the likelihood that it is more 
accurate than a polygraph.24  By focusing on more measures, 
                                                          
 17. Holmes, supra note 7, at 366 (stating the National Academy of Sciences has 
concluded that many studies that had validated the use of polygraphs were flawed 
and that “the levels of accuracy in the studies are almost certainly higher than actual 
polygraph accuracy of specific-incident testing in the field” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Many conscious and unconscious biological and psychological factors can 
affect polygraph results.  COMM. TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE 
POLYGRAPH, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 212–13 (2003).  
The National Academy of the Sciences concluded further that “the scientific base for 
detecting deception remains weak” but that it is “the best way for government 
agencies to assess techniques that are presented as useful for detecting and deterring 
criminals and national security threats.”  Id. at 221. 
 18. Florence & Friedman, supra note 14, at 428–29. 
 19. See Holmes, supra note 7, at 366 (asserting that blood pressure varies from 
minute to minute for reasons that have nothing to do with deception). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. (“[D]eceptive answers should produce different physiological responses 
than non-deceptive answers.”).  Additional studies have also tested the theory using 
thermal screening and pattern detection rather than the traditional measurements 
of blood pressure, heart rate, respiration rate, and skin conductivity.  Id. 
 22. See id. at 366–67 (postulating that the FAST program focuses on signs of 
harmful intent and that malintent shows through “abnormal behavior or extreme 
physiological reactions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra note 6 and 
accompanying text (defining malintent as intent to commit a crime). 
 23. Holmes, supra note 7, at 366–67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. Id. at 367 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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proponents argue that FAST is able to detect the subtle difference 
between someone who is simply stressed for innocent reasons, such as 
missing a flight, versus someone with malintent.25 
According to DHS, FAST uses non-intrusive sensors to detect 
physiological and behavioral cues, and the system aggregates the data 
under the Theory of Malintent to discover the mental state of a 
person and whether that person intends to cause harm.26  The 
current manifestation of the system uses five sensor packages to 
obtain various readings from screened individuals, including sensors 
to measure the cardiovascular and respiratory systems, a remote eye 
tracker, thermal cameras, high-resolution cameras to track body 
movements, and audio capture devices.27  Currently, DHS is considering 
other sensor packages, including pheromone level detectors.28 
The current system is similar to the baseline-questioning approach 
used in polygraph examinations.29  People are individually scanned 
while they wait in line or walk down a corridor to establish their own 
                                                          
 25. Id. 
 26. SCI. & TECH. DIRECTORATE, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PART I:  TECHNICAL 
DIVISIONAL REQUIREMENTS 12 (2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/ 
fasttechreqs.pdf (explaining that FAST will use “[m]ethods for non-invasively 
identifying deceptive and suspicious behavior”); SCI. & TECH. DIRECTORATE, DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING 
TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008) [hereinafter DHS PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_ 
pia_st_fast.pdf (describing the Theory of Malintent). 
 27. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 4 (adding that DHS is 
considering using pheromone detection technology in FAST as well); SCI. & TECH. 
DIRECTORATE, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE 
FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION 
BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 5 (2011) [hereinafter DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
UPDATE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ 
st_fast-a.pdf.  The cardiovascular and respiratory sensors can determine heart rate 
and calculate its variability as well as measure respiration rate and respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia.  DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 4.  The remote eye 
tracker tracks the gaze of an individual’s eyes and measures his or her pupil 
diameter.  Id.  The thermal cameras measure changes in skin temperature and can 
assess electrodermal activity.  Id.  High-resolution video cameras take images of the 
face and body to analyze facial features and expressions and body movements.  Id.  
FAST also uses an audio system to determine voice pitch changes.  Id. 
 28. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 4; see Calvin Biesecker, 
DHS S&T Begins Testing System that Screens People for Hostile Intent, DEF. DAILY, Sept. 19, 
2008 (indicating that researchers at the University of Pennsylvania have linked 
different odors to different emotional states). 
 29. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61; see also DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra 
note 6, at 15. 
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baseline.30  Once a person’s baseline is established, security officers 
will ask the person questions while the system analyzes changes in the 
person’s autonomic nervous system to determine if that person has 
malintent.31  Although the current system uses stimuli in the form of 
an officer questioning an individual, DHS plans to perfect the system 
to detect malintent without needing operator-induced stimulation.32  
DHS notes that this change would allow FAST to detect malintent 
from greater distances and in places where a person would not 
expect to be subject to security screening.33 
FAST is still in the developmental phase, and DHS has released 
only a few results from laboratory and field tests.34  The system has an 
eighty-one percent classification accuracy in a laboratory test setting, 
where contact sensors are used instead of remote sensors to validate 
the theory.35  DHS later conducted controlled tests at undisclosed 
locations, recruiting volunteers from the food industry to work at a 
special event that required screening to protect important guests.36  
In the first “Draper” test, DHS assigned the volunteers a “malintent” 
or “no malintent” condition and asked them to smuggle a prohibited 
item into the venue.37  Although this field test did not involve any 
                                                          
 30. See Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61 (revealing that individuals might be 
scanned while they wait in line at the airport); see also DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra 
note 6, at 8 (describing that study participants present their identification to a guard 
before entering the screening and being questioned). 
 31. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining that by answering a few 
questions, FAST “can figure out whether you’re naughty or nice, all on the spot, 
without knowing anything else about you”); see DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra note 
6, at 16 (explaining that “[i]ndividuals must serve as their own baseline” before being 
asked control and relevant questions). 
 32. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE, supra note 27, at 2 (“The overall 
goal of [the] FAST project is to determine whether technology can enable the 
identification and interpretation of a screened subject’s physiological and behavioral 
cues or signatures without the need for operator-induced stimuli . . . .”). 
 33. Id.  DHS notes that this would limit the chance for people to alter their body 
language due to the passive, non-intrusive nature of the system because a person 
would have very little warning that he or she is being scanned.  Id. 
 34. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 60. 
 35. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) 
SYSTEM 2 [hereinafter FAST FACT SHEET], available at http://epic.org/privacy/ 
fastinstallation.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2014). 
 36. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) 
5 (2010) [hereinafter DHS FAST FOOD INDUSTRY STUDY], available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/fastinstallation.pdf. 
 37. DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 9–10 (running the Draper test by 
placing food service volunteers into three categories:  (1) no malintent, (2) 
malintent without device, and (3) malintent with goal of smuggling a recording 
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actual crimes, volunteers were unaware that they were involved in a 
test and were motivated by a monetary bonus if they made it through 
and by a loss of funds if they did not.38  Similar to the planned 
operational deployment, the volunteers had a baseline recorded 
while approaching a guard where they presented identification.39  
Next, the volunteers entered the screening area to answer a few 
questions.40  Based on a computer algorithm containing the 
malintent theory, the volunteers were then sent for additional 
screening if they showed indices of malintent based on the 
fluctuation between their vital signs when they initially approached a 
guard and when a guard subsequently questioned them.41  DHS 
hopes that the system will soon be ready for deployment in less 
controlled venues, such as mass transit portals and border crossings, 
but still employing only volunteers.42 
DHS would primarily use FAST as a preliminary screening tool to 
indicate whether a scannee should be screened further.43  The system 
is designed to give screeners additional information about the people 
in a security line and “is not intended to provide ‘probable cause’ for 
law enforcement processes,”44 meaning that no one can be arrested 
simply for triggering the scans.45  Unlike a metal detector, which 
provides concrete evidence that the person has a concealed and 
unidentified metal object, a FAST scan would only increase suspicion 
                                                          
device into the facility); see also DHS FAST FOOD INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note 36, at 5 
(reporting on a second test that recruited participants with food or security 
experience and assigning them malintent or no malintent conditions similar to the 
Draper test in 2011). 
 38. DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 9–12. 
 39. Id. at 7, 15. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. Id.  The FAST system uses a complex statistical algorithm that can aggregate 
data from multiple databases to detect signs of malintent.  Margaret Hu, Biometric ID 
Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1499 (2013) (explaining that FAST “rel[ies] upon 
complex statistical algorithms that can . . . ‘predict’ future criminal or terrorist acts” 
through covert cybersurveillance and data mining). 
 42. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE, supra note 27, at 3. 
 43. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 62 (highlighting that, for example, flight 
passengers who show malintent would be sent for additional screening, which is “the 
same thing that happens when a passenger’s behavior sets off suspicion in the 
frontline security officers”).  DHS claims the system would allow security screenings 
to go faster for the vast majority of people because the only people who would need 
to go through the secondary screening would be those that triggered FAST.  See id. 
(“We have a lot of people in line, and we have to get them through quicker.  We have 
to identify the people of interest.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 44. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE, supra note 27, at 2. 
 45. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 62. 
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that a person might intend to commit a crime.46  FAST merely flags a 
person for additional review and, similar to polygraphs, the results of 
a FAST scan cannot be used in a court of law.47 
B. Criticism of the FAST System 
Commentators are critical of FAST for two main reasons:  (1) FAST 
potentially has an indefinite scope, and (2) the theory underlying 
FAST is undermined by the same flaws that plague the polygraph.  
These fears are not unfounded given DHS’s indication that the 
system could be deployed at airport and border checkpoints or at 
large public events, such as sporting venues or high-profile 
conventions.48  Further, DHS intends to deploy mobile units across 
cities to detect crimes before they occur.49  Because FAST can capture 
data remotely and the scannees may not realize that they are being 
scanned, the government could covertly monitor ordinary citizens.50 
DHS already uses behavioral detection specialists in airport 
screenings and high profile events.51  During the 2005 Presidential 
Inauguration, DHS posted Screening of Passengers by Observation 
Techniques (“SPOT”) agents at Metro stations in the District of 
Columbia to detect indices of malintent.52  If the government uses 
behavioral detection technology beyond the national security 
                                                          
 46. Lindsey Gil, Note, Bad Intent or Just a Bad Day?  Fourth Amendment 
Implications Raised by Technological Advances in Security Screening, 16 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 231, 254–55 (2010). 
 47. Eisenberg, supra note 8. 
 48. FAST FACT SHEET, supra note 35, at 2. 
 49. Solomon, supra note 5. 
 50. Hu, supra note 41, at 1499; Margit Sutrop & Katrin Laas-Mikko, From Identity 
Verification to Behavior Prediction:  Ethical Implications of Second Generation Biometrics, 29 
REV. POL’Y RES. 21, 22–23 (2012); Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) Project 
FOIA Request, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/fastproject 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2014) (arguing that FAST is a “sensor array used to conduct 
covert surveillance of individuals who are not suspected of any crime”). 
 51. Florence & Freidman, supra note 14, at 425–26.  Screening of Passengers by 
Observation Techniques (“SPOT”) is a DHS program wherein DHS Behavioral 
Detection Officers screen airport passengers for people who exhibit strange or 
anxious behavior, such as “changes in mannerisms, excessive sweating on a cool day, 
or changes in the pitch of a person’s voice.”  Id.  SPOT focuses on subtle behavior, 
such as “facial micro-expressions” and body language.  Id. at 426.  Facial micro-
expressions can include the slant of one’s eyebrows, while body language can be as 
innocuous as slumped posture or excessive pocket patting.  Id. 
 52. Id. at 434 (arguing that because SPOT does not require any specialized 
screening equipment, it can be “highly beneficial to all modes of transportation” and 
“could foreshadow an expanded use of the program at other public places 
frequented by large numbers of Americans”). 
ROGERS.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  7:50 PM 
348 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:337 
context, “[i]t is not inconceivable that the U.S. intelligence 
community’s alleged domestic use of spy satellites could be combined 
with SPOT-like visual cue observation[s] so that virtually everybody in 
a public place is subject to behavioral profiling at all times.”53  As 
DHS plans to use FAST for ordinary crime detection,54 the mass 
surveillance of Americans’ intimate activities would become a cheap 
and easy endeavor for the government to pursue.55 
The more common concern is that, similar to a polygraph, the 
indicators that DHS ascribes to malintent can be triggered for other 
reasons, such as going to see one’s mistress.56  DHS nevertheless notes 
that the system is able to detect whether a suspect is just nervous or in 
fact has malintent because the system measures the scannee against 
his or her own individualized baseline.57  Moreover, because FAST 
only detects intent to commit a crime, it is unlikely that it would be 
able to detect when someone unknowingly carries a bomb into a 
secure area or if a terrorist believes that what he is doing is not a 
crime.58  A researcher at Carnegie Mellon University questions the 
theory that certain biometrics are related to intent, while other 
researchers fear a prohibitive number of false positives.59  The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) also expressed concerns 
with the reliability of behavioral detection since peer-reviewed 
publications “do not support the use of behavioral indicators to 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 434–35.  Justin Florence and Robert Friedman’s article was published 
before there was widespread knowledge of the FAST system and that DHS was 
already developing a remote behavioral detection program. 
 54. Solomon, supra note 5 (postulating that DHS could deploy mobile units to 
detect crime before it occurs). 
 55. Everett, supra note 12, at 6. 
 56. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 62 (suggesting that FAST in its current form would be useless against 
people who unknowingly carry bombs because the theory behind the technology is 
premised on what people know). 
 59. See id. (“In screening large populations for exceedingly rare occurrences, 
false positives dominate outcomes; any researcher engaging in a modicum of 
quantitative analysis would reject the hypothesis immediately.”); Pam Benson, Will 
Airports Screen for Body Signals?  Researchers Hope So, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ 
2009/TECH/10/06/security.screening (last updated Oct. 6, 2009, 9:15 PM) 
(relating that Professor Stephen Fienberg of Carnegie Mellon University does not 
believe the available peer-reviewed research validates the theory of malintent or that 
malintent can be determined via measurements of an individual’s vital signs); see also 
Solomon, supra note 5 (asserting that some researchers claim using physiological 
indicators to predict malicious intent could inadvertently cause FAST to flag 
“innocent people”). 
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identify mal-intent or threats to aviation.”60  Combined with the inability 
to detect certain actions, FAST possesses potential weaknesses. 
C. How FAST Purports to Protect a Scannee’s Privacy 
DHS provides extensive security for the participants’ personally 
identifiable information (PII) during testing.61  All participants are 
identified through an anonymous code that is not linked to any PII.62  
Any PII received from the intake surveys is secured in a separate 
laboratory accessible only to laboratory personnel, and all testing 
data is stored on a private network.63  Further, any data obtained 
during the tests is retained only to validate the system and the 
DHS Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) receives only 
aggregate results.64 
DHS has not disclosed how it will protect the data that it obtains 
during FAST’s operational deployments,65 but proponents note 
                                                          
 60. Aviation Security:  TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection 
Activities:  Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Transp. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
113th Cong. 31–32 (2013) (prepared statement of Stephen M. Lord, Managing 
Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Government Accountability 
Office).  The Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) concerns have focused on 
the SPOT program and “human observation unaided by technology,” so its 
conclusions, though valid, may not fully conform to FAST; however, GAO has 
mentioned that some studies concluded that behavioral indicators generally are 
unable to detect malintent.  Id. at 31.  Some members of the media criticize DHS for 
“fall[ing] for a classic form of self-deception:  the belief that you can read liars’ 
minds by watching their bodies.”  Behavior Detection Isn’t Paying Off, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/behavior-detection-isnt-
paying-off.html?_r=0. 
 61. PII is any information that can identify a person, including demographic 
information, video and audio recordings, images, medical records, and 
psychophysiological measurements.  DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 
26, at 6–7. 
 62. Id. at 5, 8 (assigning a unique anonymous identifier to the test participants to 
guard their individual data, including demographic, medical and psychiatric 
information, and medication and substance use data). 
 63. Id. at 8–9; see also DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE, supra note 27, at 6 
(noting that video and thermal data is password protected and encrypted, that all 
data is anonymized and aggregated before being reported, and that once data starts 
being collected, there is no external network connection). 
 64. DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 26, at 4–5 (explaining that the 
data obtained from the test is only shared outside the testing laboratory in the 
aggregate); DHS PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE, supra note 27, at 6 (indicating 
that DHS S&T “does not have access to, and does not retain, the information 
collected by researchers”). 
 65. See Sutrop & Laas-Mikko, supra note 50, at 29 (“[I]t has not been determined 
which kind of privacy policy will be implemented for operating the system in reality.  
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that the system would be unable to obtain PII from the scans.66  
Additionally, DHS has indicated that it plans to dispose of the 
data after each scannee has passed through the system and has 
been cleared.67 
Despite these assurances, the system could potentially be used to 
gather data on the public, including using facial recognition to 
compare against criminal databases or to track movements of people 
through recognition of their biometrics, rather than using PII.68 
                                                          
So far we only have the promise of . . . Homeland Security Advanced Research 
Projects Agency [that] ‘[t]he system does not record or maintain your information.  
Once any issues are resolved, the information is dumped.’”); Email from Jeramie D. 
Scott, Summer Law Clerk, EPIC Open Gov’t Project, Alex Stout, Summer Law Clerk, 
EPIC Open Gov’t Project, & John Verdi, Dir., EPIC Open Gov’t Project, to Diane 
Saunders, Acting Freedom of Info. Act Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 7, 
2011), available at http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/EPIC_FOIA-FAST-Project.pdf 
(highlighting that while laboratory testing is anonymized, DHS has not indicated 
whether it would follow the same procedures with field-testing). 
 66. See Sutrop & Laas-Mikko, supra note 50, at 29 (quoting the deputy director of 
the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency that FAST would not 
record or maintain PII); Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61 (explaining that DHS 
has developed the system to ensure that it does not tie scanned data to PII); Real-life 
“Minority Report” Program Gets a Try-out, CBS (Oct. 7, 2011, 5:27 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/real-life-minority-report-program-gets-a-try-out 
(asserting that a deployed system would not capture PII).  Contra Real-life “Minority 
Report” Program Gets a Try-out, supra (highlighting that FAST is labeled a “privacy 
sensitive system,” which is defined as a system that “collects, uses, disseminates, or 
maintains” PII (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67. Cherry & Corley, supra note 7, at 61. 
 68. See Sutrop & Laas-Mikko, supra note 50, at 31 (predicting “function creep” 
with biometric identification that would lead to tracking ordinary citizens in public 
places).  The Department of Defense has a program that seeks to positively identify 
people who pose a threat to U.S. national security through the use of biometrics.  
See DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE BIOMETRIC ENABLED INTELLIGENCE (BEI) AND FORENSIC 
ENABLED INTELLIGENCE (FEI) 1–2 (2012), available at https://info.publicintelligence. 
net/DoD-BiometricIntelligence.pdf; Identity/Biometric Enabled Intelligence, BOOZ 
ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com/consulting/technology/cyber-security/ 
identity/identity-biometric-enabled-intelligence (last visited Dec. 21, 2014) 
(outlining that biometric-enabled intelligence can be collected overtly and covertly 
to match people to a place or activity by using biometrics such as facial scans, 
video, and “3D full-body scans”). 
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II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Fourth Amendment Principles Underlying an Administrative Search 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 
governmental searches.69  In Katz v. United States,70 Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion set forth the current test to determine whether 
government activity constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.71  Under that test, a Fourth Amendment search occurs 
when “a person ha[s] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy” in the place searched and “the expectation [is] one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”72  As the majority of 
the Court emphasized in Katz, the Fourth Amendment’s purpose is to 
“protect[] people, not places.”73 
However, the Supreme Court has expressly noted that this right 
only applies to things in which a person has an expectation of 
privacy—not to things that a person knowingly exposes to the 
public.74  The Supreme Court has distinguished through a number of 
cases that evidence that is exposed to the public is not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment, such as by aerial observations of an enclosed 
backyard75 or by the police going through a person’s garbage.76  This 
                                                          
 69. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 71. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. (explaining that “a man’s home” is a place when he can expect privacy but 
that he cannot expect privacy in information he places in the public domain).  
Although the Katz test on its face seems to displace the common law doctrine of a 
search involving a physical trespass into a protected area, it only supplements the 
common law test.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2012). 
 73. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 
(1966) (postulating that the overriding purpose of the Fourth Amendment is “to 
protect personal privacy”); Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“In their persons and property, however, individuals ‘are not shorn of all Fourth 
Amendment protections when they step from their homes onto the public 
sidewalks.’” (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979))). 
 74. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 75. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (finding that a homeowner does 
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when it was possible to view the 
marijuana plants in the greenhouse from an aerial or elevated perspective); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (determining that if the public can 
see evidence, even if it is inside of a person’s home, then police officers need not 
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doctrine affirms that “an individual may not legitimately demand 
privacy for activities conducted out of doors . . . , except in the area 
immediately surrounding the home.”77  The Court rests its analysis on 
the notion that no “intimate activities” take place in open fields 
outside of the home and that there is no societal interest in 
protecting such outside activities, especially when members of the 
general public can easily observe these activities.78  However, the 
Court has not addressed the question of what occurs when a police 
officer, while on a public thoroughfare, observes the activities that 
occur inside of a house.79  Several federal courts of appeals have 
addressed this issue and concluded that officers can look through the 
windows of a home to observe evidence but that to seize that 
evidence, the officers must still obtain a warrant to enter the 
protected area.80  There is no Fourth Amendment search if the item 
was knowingly exposed to the public. 
The Fourth Amendment most clearly prohibits a physical trespass 
into a protected area, but the analysis becomes more difficult when 
the government uses technology to “see into” a protected area 
                                                          
“shield their eyes when passing by [the] home on public thoroughfares” and 
concluding that an individual did not have an expectation of privacy in marijuana 
plants on his property when they were visible to the public from an aerial view). 
 76. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39–40 (1988).  Greenwood notes that a 
mere expectation of privacy is not enough:  society must be prepared to recognize 
the expectation as reasonable.  Id. at 40.  In the case of trash, society is not ready to 
recognize an expectation of privacy in one’s garbage as reasonable because garbage 
is “readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of 
the public.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 77. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
 78. Id. at 179. 
 79. See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 
1099, 1099–1100 (2009) (exploring the “knock and talk” police procedure where 
police officers, without probable cause, knock on a door so they can observe items 
within a house and noting that the Supreme Court had not addressed whether this 
procedure violates the Fourth Amendment). 
 80. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
officers have a lawful right to observe activities conducted within a protected area 
from a public street but that they may not enter the home without a warrant or 
absent exigent circumstances); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 
1990) (finding that as long as the police had a right to be where they could observe 
evidence, they could legally view anything they could see); see also Bradley, supra note 
79, at 1099–1100 (stating that federal courts of appeals and state courts have 
approved of the “knock and talk” procedure).  But see Pate v. Mun. Court, 89 Cal. 
Rptr. 893, 895 (1970) (finding a search when a suspect closed his motel room 
curtains and the officer climbed a trellis to look into the suspect’s room on the 
second floor of the motel). 
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without a physical trespass.  The Supreme Court explained in Kyllo v. 
United States81 that when the government uses a sense-enhancing 
device not generally used by the public to obtain information from a 
protected place that could only otherwise be obtained through a 
physical trespass, a search has occurred.82  The Kyllo test emphasizes 
what the search reveals rather than the search method used.83  The 
Kyllo Court noted that the thermal imager at issue in the case could 
detect intimate activities such as “at what hour each night the lady of 
the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would 
consider ‘intimate.’”84 
The Court has recognized an exception to this general rule, 
however, when the device used cannot obtain any intimate details 
about the place searched but, rather, can only reveal the existence or 
non-existence of contraband.85  In United States v. Place,86 the Court 
held that using a drug-sniffing dog that could only reveal the 
presence or absence of contraband was merely a sense-enhancing 
search, not an extra-sensory search; since the sense-enhancing search 
could not reveal intimate details, it was not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment.87  Accordingly, the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence allows warrantless binary sense-enhancing searches88 
since they are not searches under the Fourth Amendment but 
                                                          
 81. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been 
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ 
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in 
general public use.” (citations omitted)). 
 83. Luke J. Albrecht, Case Comment, Constitutional Law—The Use of a Thermal 
Imaging Device Constitutes a Search Under the Fourth Amendment—Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27 (2001), 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 255 (2002) (arguing that the Court 
properly focused its analysis in Kyllo on the place that was searched and not on the 
intrusiveness of the search). 
 84. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38. 
 85. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“[T]he canine sniff is sui 
generis.  We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in 
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the 
information revealed by the procedure.”). 
 86. 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 87. Id. at 707 (reasoning that a drug-sniffing dog can tell authorities only limited 
information about the contents of a container—whether or not the container 
contains contraband—and thus does not embarrass the owner of the property).  
Place held further that with probable cause, the government is able to briefly detain 
an individual’s luggage to obtain a search warrant from a judge.  Id. 
 88. The term “binary search,” as used here, means a search that can only reveal 
the presence or absence of contraband—nothing more. 
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disapproves of extra-sensory searches that have the potential to reveal 
intimate details about the place searched.89 
The Court recently ruled in Riley v. California90 that police officers 
cannot search the contents of a person’s cell phone without a warrant 
because the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
phone’s contents.91  The Court relied on the “vast quantities of 
personal information” that cell phones contain and distinguished the 
searches from the “brief physical search” that the doctrine normally 
encompasses.92  Specifically, cell phones contain sensitive personal 
information, such as videos, prescriptions, and bank statements, that 
were not feasibly carried around with a person “[p]rior to the digital 
age.”93  Cell phones contain Internet search histories that could show 
that the person “search[ed] for certain symptoms of disease,” 
information on individuals’ locations and private lives, and “sensitive 
records previously found in the home.”94  The Supreme Court 
prohibited law enforcement from searching phones without a warrant 
specifically because phones contain highly sensitive information. 
The Court has allowed limited searches without a warrant, but only 
where an officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and 
dangerous prior to conducting the search.  In Terry v. Ohio,95 the 
Court justified this narrow exception with the need to protect the 
officer, where the officer “has reason to believe that he is dealing with 
an armed and dangerous individual.”96  The Court, however, noted 
that the suspicion had to arise before the search:  the search could 
not be used to justify the need for the search.97 
                                                          
 89. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707  (“A canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection 
dog . . . does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden 
from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the contents 
of . . . luggage.  Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through this 
investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search.”). 
 90. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
 91. Id. at 2492, 2494 (holding that neither the officer safety nor the preservation 
of evidence justification permitted officers to search the contents of the defendant’s 
cell phone without a warrant). 
 92. Id. at 2485. 
 93. Id. at 2489–90. 
 94. Id. at 2489–91. 
 95. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 96. Id. at 27. 
 97. See id. at 30 (finding that “[a]t the time” the decision to search for weapons 
was made, the officer “had reasonable grounds to believe that [the] petitioner was 
armed and dangerous”). 
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B. The Administrative Search Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
Although a search is presumed unreasonable without a warrant, 
the Court has carved out several exceptions when a warrant is not 
required.98  The administrative search exception99 allows a warrantless 
search of people and places in highly regulated industries pursuant 
to a regulatory scheme as long as the governmental interest in the 
search outweighs its intrusion of people’s privacy rights.100  The 
administrative exception excuses the need for individual suspicion in 
highly regulated industries if there is a substantial governmental 
interest and the inspection furthers a governmental regulatory 
                                                          
 98. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (recalling that a 
search incident to a lawful arrest has long been a traditional exception to the warrant 
requirement); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (allowing a search of 
an area within an arrestee’s reach).  The exceptions are “(1) stop-and-frisk 
search[es]; (2) administrative searches; (3) the border search; and (4) searches 
based on express or implied consent.”  Bethany A. Gulley, Note, Criminal Law—No 
Right to Revoke and Avoid Search—Ninth Circuit Rules that Consent to Airport Screening 
Cannot be Revoked in an Administrative Search.  United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th 
Cir. 2007), 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 515, 518 n.34 (2009) (citation omitted). 
 99. In order for the balancing requirement of an administrative search to apply, 
a court must first find that a special need exists.  United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 
F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (using a “special need” for security checkpoints to allow airport 
screenings under the administrative search exception); Eve Brensike Primus, 
Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 275–76 (2011) (stating 
that the Supreme Court uses the “special needs test” to determine the validity of 
administrative searches (internal quotation marks omitted)).  First, a court must 
determine whether there is a special need beyond normal law enforcement needs.  
Id. at 276.  If so, then the court will balance the governmental need for the search 
versus the intrusiveness of the search.  Id.  Under this balancing test, the court must 
factor the subject’s privacy interest versus the government’s interest in the search 
and the scope of the governmental intrusion.  Id. 
100. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (explaining that the test for 
determining the reasonableness of a search involves assessing if the search was 
justified and, as conducted, was reasonably related to the circumstances that justified 
it); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530, 533–35 (1967) (finding that since an 
administrative search does not seek evidence of criminality, it is less of an intrusion 
and is outweighed by the governmental interest in “securing city-wide compliance 
with minimum physical standards for private property”). 
Since the administrative search doctrine is a widely used exception to the warrant 
requirement, one would expect its boundaries to be clear, but “the rules governing 
administrative searches are notoriously unclear.”  Primus, supra note 99, at 257.  
Some commentators have suggested that administrative search law actually conflates 
two separate doctrines—so-called “dragnet searches” and “special subpopulation 
searches”—and that much of the confusion around its use comes from the melding 
of these doctrines.  Id. at 259 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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scheme.101  A highly regulated industry is one where there is “such a 
history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an 
enterprise,” such as weapons distributors, pawnshops, mines, 
quarries, and junkyards.102  This later was expanded to include 
“special subpopulations,” such as students or governmental 
employees, and both are now analyzed under whether the 
government has a “special need” to conduct the search.103  To further 
the governmental regulatory scheme, the search must perform the 
functions of a warrant, give notice of the search, and limit the 
discretion of the searching officers; the search also needs to be 
narrowly tailored to further that scheme.104  The administrative 
search exception is commonly invoked to justify warrantless 
searches in airports.105  The exception can be invoked only in 
exceptional circumstances, however, and cannot be used to further 
the ordinary course of police investigations, such as drug 
interdiction or solving murders.106  Moreover, to fit within the 
                                                          
 101. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987) (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 
452 U.S. 594, 600–02 (1981)); see also Primus, supra note 99, at 270 (“First, the 
searches had to be justified in terms of the balance between the importance of the 
government’s interest and the degree of intrusion upon individuals. . . .  Second, 
dispensing with the requirement of individualized suspicion had to be necessary in 
order to advance the governmental interest at stake.  Third, the searches had to be 
cabined in ways that limited the discretion of executive officials . . . .”). 
 102. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700–04 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 103. Primus, supra note 99, at 287–88. 
 104. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03. 
 105. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (explaining that 
the government screens airline passengers as part of an administrative scheme to 
prevent people from bringing explosive devices on to or hijacking planes), overruled 
in part by United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 106. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[S]uspicionless searches are never allowed if their principle end is ordinary crime-
solving.”); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (explaining that 
never before has the administrative exception been used to justify warrantless 
searches for the purpose of routine law enforcement); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (commenting that courts may substitute 
the administrative search test for the traditional Fourth Amendment requirement 
that a search cannot be conducted unless it is accompanied by a warrant based on 
probable cause only in “exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 
requirement impracticable”).  The administrative search is likely the exception that 
would be invoked by the government to justify the use of the FAST scans.  Cf. Gil, 
supra note 46, at 246–49, 261 (stating that security searches in airports fall under the 
administrative search exception).  The special need must be a unique problem that 
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exception, these searches must be minimally intrusive and directly 
related to the special governmental need.107 
Despite being an exception to the warrant requirement, 
administrative searches must be reasonable.  The federal courts of 
appeals, particularly the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
have enumerated a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of 
the administrative search, using the totality of the circumstances 
approach, by weighing the governmental “need” versus the intrusion 
onto a person’s individual privacy.108 
                                                          
law enforcement officers would not encounter in the course of their day-to-day 
routine.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.9(a) (3d ed. 2007). 
 107. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search:  Intrusiveness and the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1201, 1206–07 (2010) (explaining that 
the Supreme Court has allowed the warrantless use of technology only when the 
amount of information revealed is “tightly circumscribed”); Gil, supra note 46, at 247 
(explaining that the administrative search exception requires that the search be 
minimally intrusive and the governmental interest must be significant and 
legitimate).  To determine the validity of a “special needs” search, courts must 
consider three factors:  (1) the government’s need for the search, (2) the character 
and nature of the search, and (3) the nature of the privacy interest involved.  Cassidy 
v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 108. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Davis took the lead in developing this 
doctrine.  482 F.2d 893 at 910 (arguing that requiring officers to secure warrants to 
screen airline passengers would “frustrate the governmental [administrative] 
purpose” but limiting the government’s authority to only those searches that are not 
intrusive (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Other circuits have adopted the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis.  See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
118–19 (2001)) (arguing that the balancing of the government’s interest in 
deterring and preventing passengers from bringing explosive devices on to 
airplanes overcomes an individual passenger’s interest in his or her privacy, 
particularly because the Transportation Security Administration has put in place 
safeguards to protect passengers’ privacy); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 
178–79 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Suspicionless checkpoint searches are permissible under the 
Fourth Amendment when a court finds a favorable balance between the gravity of 
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances 
the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 807–08 
(2d Cir. 1974) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Davis, where the court 
held that airport security searches fall under the administrative search exception 
because they are designed to catch would-be hijackers, and to justify the 
constitutionality of airport searches).  The Supreme Court also endorsed the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in a footnote.  See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 675 n.3 (1989) (recalling that the special needs search doctrine has long been 
established under cases like Davis). 
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A minimally intrusive search is one that is “well-tailored to protect 
[an individual’s] personal privacy”109 and furthers a governmental 
interest.110  To further a governmental interest, the regulatory scheme 
must fulfill the purpose of a warrant and be:  (1) known to scannees 
prior to its occurrence; (2) limited in scope; and (3) narrowly 
tailored to the government’s special need.111  For example, an 
administrative airport search is valid if the search is limited to 
searching for guns, explosives, or other dangerous devices that may 
jeopardize airport safety.112  These searches are ultimately justified by 
the governmental interest in preventing terrorist attacks, but they 
become unconstitutional once they are used to target common criminal 
activity, such as drug smuggling, larceny, money laundering, or identity 
theft.113  Indeed, the special need must be unique to the situation.114 
III. PRIVACY INTEREST IN MEDICAL DATA 
A. Remotely Gathering Medical Data 
When the Fourth Amendment was drafted, a physician could only 
obtain medical data through a physical examination.115  It is now 
possible for a doctor to diagnose a patient only from looking at the 
patient’s medical records and vital signs without ever physically 
examining the patient.116  Additionally, physicians can now remotely 
                                                          
 109. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 (quoting Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180). 
 110. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987). 
 111. Id.  In the context of airport security searches, the search must be “conducted 
in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with 
reasonable scope and the passenger [must have] been given advance notice of his 
liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.”  
United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). 
 112. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 960 (reasoning that airport screening searches are part of a 
regulatory scheme to prevent plane bombings and hijackings). 
 113. Davis, 482 F.2d at 908–09 (requiring that courts must exclude evidence from 
airport searches that are “subverted” into general searches for criminal evidence); see 
also Aukai, 497 F.3d at 959 (indicating that that “special governmental needs” exceed 
those of “normal . . . law enforcement” but must be balanced against individual 
expectations of privacy (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665–66)); Albarado, 495 F.2d at 
807–08 (proposing that administrative searches in an airport context are not 
designed to catch criminals but to deter armed hijackers). 
 114. Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 662–63 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 115. See L.G. Eichner, The Practice of Domestic Medicine During the Colonial Period, 
41 TREDYFFRIN EASTTOWN HIST. Q. 100, 103 (2004) (explaining that a physician would 
compare a patient’s symptoms to descriptions of diseases in medical textbooks to 
diagnose the patient). 
 116. What Is Telemedicine?, AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N, http://www.americantelemed. 
org/about-telemedicine/what-is-telemedicine#.VEpaEvldXOI (last visited Dec. 21, 
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monitor long-term patients through non-invasive electrocardiographic 
and respiratory monitors that track arterial oxygen saturation, skin 
temperature, body weight, blood pressure, and blood glucose 
levels117—similar to the metrics that will be analyzed by the FAST system. 
By remotely scanning vital signs, a FAST scan would be able to 
remotely gather medical data on the scannees.  The FAST system is 
designed to remotely monitor physiological characteristics such as 
heart rate, respiratory rate, eye movement, body temperature, 
pheromone levels, and audio levels.118  The measurements are then 
used to detect abnormalities in physiology.119  Respiratory 
measurements are used to evaluate respiratory disorders, such as 
respiratory dysfunction and cystic fibrosis, as well as to measure the 
severity of the disease in patients with asthma or community-acquired 
pneumonia.120  Using FAST’s respiratory sensors, DHS would be able 
to measure these rates, and if so inclined, to obtain a detailed 
medical record on any person scanned by FAST. 
Measuring beat-to-beat fluctuations in heart rate provides an 
analysis of the principal cardiovascular control systems, and it can 
determine the overall health of the cardiovascular system and 
                                                          
2014) (informing on the nature of telemedicine, which includes a review of medical 
records, remote gathering of vital signs, and possibly a video conference between 
patient and doctor); see also Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1136 (3d Cir. 
1995) (reporting that a doctor diagnosed an employee with human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) after only reviewing the employee’s medical records). 
 117. Sara Colantonio et al., Decision Support for Remote Management of Chronic 
Patients, 83 LECTURE NOTES INST. FOR COMPUTER SCIS. SOC. INFORMATICS & TELECOMMS. 
ENGINEERING 38, 38–39 (2012) (discussing the advances in technological monitoring 
of patients with chronic diseases). 
 118. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 119. Gary B. Smith et al., Hospital-Wide Physiological Surveillance—A New Approach to 
the Early Identification and Management of the Sick Patient, 71 RESUSCITATION 19, 20 
(2006) (recognizing that vital sign measurements are important for detecting 
changes in physiology). 
 120. E.g., Iley B. Browning et al., Importance of Respiratory Rate as an Indicator of 
Respiratory Dysfunction in Patients with Cystic Fibrosis, 97 CHEST 1317, 1319 (1990) 
(cystic fibrosis); see Walter Karlen et al., Improving the Accuracy and Efficiency of 
Respiratory Rate Measurements in Children Using Mobile Devices, PLOS ONE, June 2014, at 
1, 1 (recounting that respiration rate is a “marker of serious respiratory illness” and 
“the main diagnostic criterion for childhood pneumonia”); Steven Kesten et al., 
Respiration Rate During Acute Asthma, 97 CHEST 58, 60–62 (1990) (finding that 
asthmatics had a higher respiratory rate when having an attack); J.P. McFadden et al., 
Raised Respiratory Rate in Elderly Patients:  A Valuable Physical Sign, 284 BRIT. MED. J. 626, 
627 (1982) (finding that respiratory rates in an invaluable diagnostic tool for 
respiratory disorders in elderly patients). 
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whether a patient has one of the seven classes of arrhythmias.121  
FAST’s cardiovascular measurement would be able to assess 
autonomic imbalances, disease, and mortality rates by measuring 
heart rate because heart rate variation is associated with 
cardiovascular disease.122  Heart rate variability is one of the most 
important measurements that can predict atherosclerotic plaque 
progression, which leads to heart attacks, congestive heart failure, 
and susceptibility to diabetic neuropathy.123 
Most troubling however, is that FAST can also measure 
chemosensory stimuli such as pheromone levels, which can indicate 
the existence of psychiatric diseases like anxiety and depression, as 
well as stress levels or a person’s emotional status, like fear or 
excitement.124  Further, pheromones are associated with whether a 
                                                          
 121. Solange Akselrod et al., Power Spectrum Analysis of Heart Rate Fluctuation:  A 
Quantitative Probe of Beat-to-Beat Cardiovascular Control, 213 SCIENCE 220, 220 
(1981) (cardiovascular system health); K.C. Chua et al., Cardiac State Diagnosis 
Using Higher Order Spectra of Heart Rate Variability, 32 J. MED. ENGINEERING & TECH. 
145, 154 (2008) (arrhythmia). 
 122. Julian F. Thayer et al., The Relationship of Autonomic Imbalance, Heart Rate 
Variability and Cardiovascular Disease Risk Factors, 141 INT’L J. CARDIOLOGY 122, 123 
(2010) (“[A]utonomic imbalance may be a final common pathway to increased 
morbidity and mortality from a host of conditions and diseases, including 
cardiovascular disease.  Heart rate variability (HRV) may be used to assess autonomic 
imbalances, diseases and mortality.  Parasympathetic activity and HRV have been 
associated with [many diseases] including CVD . . . .”).  See generally Kim Fox et al., 
Resting Heart Rate in Cardiovascular Disease, 50 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 823, 823 (2007) 
(explaining that heart rate is an indicator of cardiovascular disease and can 
determine the risk of cardiovascular mortality). 
 123. Borejda Xhyheri et al., Heart Rate Variability Today, 55 PROGRESS 
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES 321, 321 (2012). 
 124. Denise Chen & Jeannette Haviland-Jones, Human Olfactory Communication of 
Emotion, 91 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 771, 778–80 (2000) (finding that a person’s 
emotional states influence their body odor); Bettina M. Pause et al., Startle Response 
Potentiation to Chemosensory Anxiety Signals in Socially Anxious Individuals, 74 INT’L J. 
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 88, 91 (2009) (concluding that people communicate information 
about their emotional states through their chemosensory senses); Alexander Prehn 
et al., Chemosensory Anxiety Signals Augment the Startle Reflex in Humans, 394 
NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 127, 127 (2006) (adding that “chemosensory anxiety signals 
can be consciously identified” in humans).  Humans can recognize differences in 
pheromones to recognize kin versus non-kin.  Babies, for instance, are more 
receptive to their mother’s breast than to another’s breasts.  Richard H. Porter, 
Olfaction and Human Kin Recognition, 104 GENETICA 259, 260–61 (1999) (kin and 
maternal odor); Richard H. Porter & Jan Winberg, Unique Salience of Maternal Breast 
Odors for Newborn Infants, 23 NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. REVS. 439, 439–40 (1999) 
(breast odor recognition).  Pheromones also play a role in mate selection.  Carole 
Ober et al., HLA and Mate Choice in Humans, 61 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 497, 502–04 
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woman is ovulating and genetic compatibility.125  These vital signs, 
which DHS could scan with FAST, implicate medical data that is as 
intimate, if not more so, than the Supreme Court’s concern in Kyllo 
of the government knowing when a woman takes her evening bath.126 
B. Special Protection of Medical Records 
The highly sensitive nature of medical information is underscored 
by the special protection that the law gives medical data, even when 
held by a third party.  Traditionally, people do not have a privacy 
interest in non-medical data held by a third party, and there is 
therefore no search when that data is disclosed to the government.127  
However, people maintain a limited privacy right in medical records 
maintained by a third party.128  Unlike traditional data, medical 
records are legally protected, and the government’s need to access 
those records must be balanced against the patient’s privacy interest 
                                                          
(1997) (finding that humans tend to not mate with humans who share similar 
pheromones).  Although many studies begin in animal studies, similar results have 
been found in humans.  E.g., Chen & Haviland-Jones, supra, at 771–72. 
 125. Seppo Kuukasjärvi et al., Attractiveness of Women’s Body Odors over the Menstrual 
Cycle:  The Role of Oral Contraceptives and Receiver Sex, 15 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 579, 584 
(2004) (finding that males preferred a female’s odor when the female was nearing 
ovulation); Claus Wedekind & Sandra Füri, Body Odour Preferences in Men and Women:  
Do They Aim for Specific MHC Combinations or Simply Heterozygosity?, 264 PROC. ROYAL 
SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1471, 1476 (1997) (finding that men and women can 
distinguish odors based on genetic compatibility).  Researchers have also linked 
pheromones to indicators of sexual orientation.  Yolanda Martins et al., Preference for 
Human Body Odors Is Influenced by Gender and Sexual Orientation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 694, 
694 (2005) (suggesting that sexual orientation may affect the production of 
pheromones); Michael Craig Miller, Human Pheromones, HARV. MENTAL HEALTH 
LETTER, Nov. 2006, at 8 (detailing that some scientific research discovered a 
relationship between sexual orientation and responses to olfactory stimuli). 
 126. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
 127. United States v. Golden Valley Elec. Ass’n, 689 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“A customer ordinarily lacks ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy in an item,’ 
like a business record, ‘in which he has no possessory or ownership interest.’” 
(quoting United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000))).  But see 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the Court should reconsider whether individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information given to third parties because in the “digital 
age, . . . people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in 
the course of carrying out mundane tasks”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012) 
(requiring that electronic records beyond the basic subscriber information held by a 
communication service requires a warrant for government access). 
 128. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600, 602 (1977) (determining that 
unwarranted disclosures of stored medical records would be an invasion of privacy). 
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in those records.129  In order to access these medical records, the 
requestor must have a legitimate need for them—a higher protection 
than that given to non-medical data held by third parties.130  
Although the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s 
(HIPAA) prohibition against knowingly obtaining individually 
identifiable health information likely does not apply in the context of 
FAST because FAST is a system, and the government is neither a 
provider, plan, employer of the scannees, nor clearinghouse,131 its 
provisions highlight the extra protections that Congress has assigned 
to medical data.  Unlike data that is held by a third-party, HIPAA 
contains specific requirements that must be met before law 
enforcement is able to obtain medical data.132 
                                                          
 129. Cf. Doe v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d 1133, 1137, 1140 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the governmental intrusion for accessing an AIDS patient’s records was 
minimal since the administrator only disclosed his medical status to people who 
already knew of his condition and the patient was not discriminated against since he 
was promoted); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & 
Health, 636 F.2d 163, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that the government’s need to 
conduct a safety study to determine the cause of a skin disease was balanced against 
the privacy interest in medical records and the protection against disclosure). 
 130. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1139 (finding that there is a strong 
governmental interest in controlling health care costs by monitoring employees’ 
medical prescriptions, but that the need is for the records alone, not for the data 
contained within them); see also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 
570, 577–78 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the government has a legitimate interest 
in medical records of workers who work in a dangerous work environment to 
monitor them for health and safety reasons).  In order to obtain these records, the 
following seven-factor analysis is used:  “(1) the type of record requested; (2) the 
information it does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any subsequent 
nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which 
the record was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized 
disclosure; (6) the degree of need for access; and (7) whether there is an express 
statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest 
favoring access.”  Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 72 F.3d at 1140 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 
638 F.2d at 578). 
 131. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
punishes “[a] person who knowingly . . . obtains individually identifiable health 
information relating to an individual.”  Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 262(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 
2029 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)(2) (2012)).  However, Congress qualified 
this provision by defining “individually identifiable health information” as 
information that “(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, 
employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (B) relates to the past, present, or future 
physical or mental health or condition of an individual . . . .”  Id. § 262(a), 110 Stat. 
at 2023 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(6)) (emphasis added). 
 132. Specifically, 
Covered entities may disclose protected health information to law 
enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes under the following six 
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The special interest in medical data is heightened when that data is 
obtained directly from a suspect in the course of law enforcement 
activities.  The Fourth Amendment specifically protects “[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons.”133  This protection is 
based on the notion that the human body is inherently private and 
that an intrusion into a person’s body “can lead to the utmost 
affliction of indignity and humiliation.”134  The Supreme Court 
recently ruled that a blood test, even when the individual is obviously 
intoxicated and where law enforcement knows how quickly alcohol 
naturally metabolizes in the blood, still required a warrant if one was 
practical to obtain.135  In Missouri v. McNeely,136 a majority of the Court 
rejected the State of Missouri’s argument that the State’s interest in 
preventing drunk driving outweighed any privacy interest a person 
had in her body.137  Justice Sotomayor, in the majority opinion, stated 
that the exigency must be established on a case-by-case basis based on 
the totality of the circumstances.138  Further, Chief Justice Roberts 
                                                          
circumstances, and subject to specified conditions:  (1) as required by law . . . 
and administrative requests; (2) to identify or locate a suspect, fugitive, 
material witness, or missing person; (3) in response to a law enforcement 
official’s request for information about a victim or suspected victim of a 
crime; (4) to alert law enforcement of a person’s death, if the covered entity 
suspects that criminal activity caused the death; (5) when a covered entity 
believes that protected health information is evidence of a crime that 
occurred on its premises; and (6) by a covered health care provider in a 
medical emergency not occurring on its premises, when necessary to inform 
law enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location 
of the crime or crime victims, and the perpetrator of the crime. 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 7 (2003), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/ 
hipaa/understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf. 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 134. Demetrius Klitou, Backscatter Body Scanners—A Strip Search by Other Means, 24 
COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 316, 316 (2008) (arguing that backscatter scanners intrude 
on a person’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy since they take detailed images of 
a person’s body). 
 135. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct 1552, 1557–58, 1560, 1568 (2013) (holding 
that obvious intoxication was not an exigent circumstance even though alcohol 
dissipates in a person’s bloodstream over time and that law enforcement should have 
obtained a warrant before it physically intruded inside of the defendant’s body).  
McNeely did not address whether there would ever be an exigent circumstance that 
would require a warrantless blood test.  Id. at 1569 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 136. 133 S. Ct 1552 (2013). 
 137. Id. at 1567.  The Court found that a nonconsensual blood test violates a 
person’s privacy interest, despite the government’s interest in preventing drunk 
driving.  Id. at 1560–67. 
 138. Id. at 1560–61. 
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noted in a concurring opinion that “bodily intrusions like blood draws 
constitute searches and are subject to the warrant requirement.”139 
In a seemingly contradictory opinion during the same term, the 
Supreme Court in Maryland v. King140 held that it was constitutional 
for police to take a DNA swab of an arrestee because the test is 
minimally intrusive and does not involve a physical intrusion into a 
person’s body.141  The Court further noted that the search affected by 
a DNA swab fell under its reasonableness jurisprudence rather than 
its individualized suspicion jurisprudence.142  The Court justified its 
approach by noting that law enforcement always has the right to 
search an arrestee for identification purposes.143  The Court also 
stressed that an arrestee’s DNA profile is nothing more than part of 
his or her identity, similar to his or her name, address, or physical 
description.144  “In sum,” the Court said, “there can be little reason to 
question the legitimate interest of the government in knowing for an 
absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested, in knowing 
whether he is wanted elsewhere, and in ensuring his identification in 
the event he flees prosecution.”145  Specifically, the Court noted that law 
enforcement used the swabs to identify arrestees, not to solve crimes.146 
The Court expressly distinguished and separated DNA swabs from 
typical administrative searches in King, reserving the use of DNA 
swabs only for serious arrests and not for administrative searches or 
lessor crimes.147  Additionally, the Court confirmed that DNA swabs 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 1569 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (“Search warrants are ordinarily 
required for searches of dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be 
required where intrusions into the human body are concerned.”). 
 140. 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 141. Id. at 1969 (“A buccal swab is a far more gentle process than a venipuncture 
to draw blood.  It involves but a light touch on the inside of the cheek; and although 
it can be deemed a search within the body of the arrestee, it requires no surgical 
intrusions beneath the skin.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 142. Id. at 1970. 
 143. Id. (proclaiming that it is “uncontested” that the government has a right to 
search an arrestee’s body when the person is legally arrested). 
 144. Id. at 1972 (“The DNA collected from arrestees is an irrefutable identification 
of the person from whom it was taken.  Like a fingerprint, the 13 CODIS loci are not 
themselves evidence of any particular crime . . . .”). 
 145. Id. at 1977 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. Id. at 1978–79. 
 147. Id. at 1970–71.  But see id. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the 
majority’s position is impossible to enforce because the majority did not define what 
is a “serious crime[]” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Elizabeth E. Joh, Term 
Paper, Maryland v. King:  Policing and Genetic Privacy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 281, 294 
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do not present privacy concerns, noting that the swabs were, by 
statute, limited to collecting the “noncoding parts of the DNA that do 
not reveal the genetic traits of the arrestee” and the police legally 
could only obtain this noncoding DNA.148  The Court also brushed 
aside any concerns that these swabs could obtain any medical data 
because “[t]he argument that the testing at issue in this case reveals 
any private medical information at all is open to dispute.”149  
However, the Court concluded that the use of swabs would raise 
constitutional privacy concerns if the police were able to determine 
medical traits from the DNA swabs.150  Further, the Court has found 
that non-intrusive procedures that reveal medical data are subject to 
heightened privacy requirements.151 
Justice Scalia gives a better Fourth Amendment analysis, and 
perhaps the correct one, in his scathing rebuke of the majority 
opinion as an opinion that “taxes the credulity of the credulous.”152  
In his view, the majority did not understand how DNA evidence 
actually works and the Court’s ruling would open up the door to 
pretextual DNA stops.153  He mocked the majority’s reliance on 
identification, noting that three months passed between the 
defendant’s arrest and the date the state tested his DNA, and that an 
additional fourth month passed before the state test results revealed a 
DNA match, thus discounting the majority’s assertion that there was 
any need for identification for safety reasons before placing the 
suspect in the jail population.154  Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that 
DNA profiles of arrestees are only entered into the system after the 
arrestee has already been identified and the only justification the 
majority gave for doing DNA swabs was to solve unsolved crimes that 
had DNA evidence.155  Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that the only 
permissible identification aspect of DNA was to identify human 
remains or missing persons:  DNA had never been used in the 
                                                          
(2013) (“Regrettably, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is at once too optimistic 
and [too] doctrinally insufficient.”). 
 148. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1979. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) 
(determining that urinalyses and breathalyzer tests “can reveal a host of private 
medical facts” and thus implicate privacy concerns). 
 152. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1984. 
 155. Id. at 1984, 1986. 
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booking context as only those who had already been positively 
identified were placed into the system.156 
The fact that the swab is statutorily prohibited from obtaining the 
chromosomes that contain genetic material does not put it precisely 
at odds with the general premise that medical data, even when 
obtained directly from a person, enjoys a heightened level of 
protection.  Even though the Court in King approved of the use of 
DNA swabs, these swabs were statutorily prohibited from obtaining 
the genetic markers that could uncover genetic diseases. 
Although courts rarely analyze mass data collection under the 
special needs doctrine, a federal district court recently held that such 
broad data collection programs, even pursuant to a valid statutory 
scheme, are too broad and violate the Fourth Amendment.157  In 
Klayman v. Obama,158 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia confirmed that there is “no governmental interest . . . more 
compelling [for] the security of the Nation” than the prevention of 
terrorism when determining the constitutionality of the National 
Security Agency’s (NSA) Bulk Telephony Metadata Program to 
identify unknown terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks against the 
United States.159  The NSA’s program was designed to identify 
potential terrorists “faster” than normal investigative techniques.160  
However, the lynchpin of the court’s analysis was that the collection 
program did not independently prevent any imminent attack because 
the suspects had been identified through traditional means and not 
through the data collection program.161  Additionally, the court 
found that the data collection program infringed upon the 
reasonable expectation of privacy that the plaintiffs had in their 
telephone records that the NSA collected with the program.162  
Despite traditional jurisprudence that government acquisition of 
telephone records held by a third party was not a search,163 the NSA’s 
data collection program was so dissimilar to the traditional relationship 
                                                          
 156. Id. at 1986. 
 157. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 158. 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 159. Id. at 39 (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)). 
 160. Id. at 40. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 39. 
 163. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (concluding that the 
petitioner was not subjected to an illegal search when a phone company, without a 
warrant and at law enforcement’s request, used a pen register to collect information 
about the petitioner’s outgoing phone calls because people do not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the phone numbers they dial). 
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between law enforcement and phone companies because of the nature 
and quantity of private information NSA obtained in telephone 
metadata on almost every telephone user, and, “more importantly, what 
that information can tell the Government about people’s lives.”164  As 
a result, the court said that the NSA’s “almost-Orwellian” collection 
program was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.165 
Unlike ordinary non-medical data, the government must have a 
compelling interest to obtain medical data directly from a suspect’s 
body; therefore, the government must generally comply with the 
warrant requirement due to the intrusion upon a person’s individual 
privacy—the potential to obtain medical data.166  Data that is 
collected through biometric scans—such as FAST—can contain 
information concerning medical conditions, and such information is 
necessarily protected under the same analysis as other medical data 
that can be obtained directly from a person’s body.167 
IV. THE REASONABLENESS OF FAST UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. FAST Scans Are Fourth Amendment Searches 
A FAST scan violates the Fourth Amendment because it is an extra-
sensory search that obtains sensitive information that could otherwise 
be obtained only by a physical intrusion into a person’s body.  FAST 
does not perform an allowable binary search, such as a dog sniff that 
reveals only the presence or absence of contraband.168  FAST does not 
detect the presence or absence of contraband but, rather, only a 
potential state of mind—the intent to commit a crime.169  Although 
some commentators note that a FAST scan might indicate the 
existence of a criminal and guilty mind—nominally, a binary 
search170—a guilty mind is not independently a crime.171  Unlike dog 
                                                          
 164. Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d. at 32–37. 
 165. Id. at 33, 40–41.  Due to its national security implications, the district court 
judge stayed the order of injunction preventing the collection of phone 
metadata pending appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.  Id. at 43–44. 
 166. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1560–61 (2013). 
 167. See Hu, supra note 41, at 1481 (explaining that biometric identification 
systems can harvest general behavioral and biographical data that, if pieced together, 
could create a picture of person’s personal habits and activities). 
 168. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 169. Supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 170. E.g., Jim Harper, Florida v. Jardines:  Bolstering the Fourth Amendment, 
JURIST (Oct. 31, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/10/jim-harper-
florida-jardines.php. 
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sniffs, which only reveal the presence or absence of contraband, 
FAST searches reveal not only the presence of malintent, but 
potentially also the existence of private medical information because 
of the vital signs that FAST scans.172  Since FAST is not limited to 
revealing the presence or absence of contraband, it is not a binary 
search and therefore is excluded from the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Rather, FAST would fall under the Supreme Court’s definition of 
an extra-sensory search.  Kyllo limits extra-sensory searches that reveal 
intimate details of a constitutionally protected area that could not 
otherwise be obtained without a physical trespass by prohibiting the 
use of technology that is not in general public use.173  Similar to Kyllo, 
where the use of a thermal imager had the potential to reveal 
intimate details of the house,174 the use of FAST has the potential to 
reveal private medical details about a person.175  Normally, this 
medical data could not be obtained except through a physical 
examination.176  Similar to the Kyllo analysis, this data could 
customarily only be obtained by a physical trespass into a protected 
area because a scan of the human body that could reveal medical 
data is a search under the Kyllo analysis and is an extrasensory 
search.177  Further, Kyllo’s exception for when the technology is in 
“general public use” is inapplicable to FAST178 even though all but 
                                                          
 171. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (“A 
person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes 
a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”). 
 172. Supra notes 119–26 (delineating the medical information that is obtained 
from vital signs). 
 173. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); see supra notes 82–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 174. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 175. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 176. Thomas Frank, Anxiety-Detecting Machines Could Spot Terrorists, USA TODAY, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-18-bioscanner_N.htm (last 
updated Sept. 22, 2008) (quoting a DHS consultant that FAST is “picking up things 
with sensors that can’t necessarily be detected by the human eye” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 177. The Kyllo Court emphasized what the search could reveal, not what the search 
actually revealed.  See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.  Similarly, FAST has the potential to reveal 
private medical data. 
 178. Id. at 34.  Justice Scalia noted that the police should not be barred from using 
technology that the public could use to obtain information from a protected area; 
therefore the police could use technology that was in the public realm to obtain the 
details of a protected area.  Id. at 33–34 (holding that the advance of technology has 
exposed private areas to public view). 
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one of the sensors used in FAST is commercially available.179  As 
Justice Kagan stated in her concurrence in Florida v. Jardines,180 a dog 
is in the “general public use” but the specialized training for the 
dog’s drug detection ability is not publically available.181  Because 
FAST’s specialized technology—the combined sensor package and 
the malintent theory algorithm—is not available to the public, Kyllo’s 
public domain exception does not apply.  Therefore, a FAST scan is a 
search that falls under the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement 
unless another exception applies. 
Granted, there is an argument that there would be no search at all 
because people “knowingly expose[d]” their vital signs in public areas 
to anyone with the ability to detect them.182  However, as noted above, 
this analysis is similar to that used in Kyllo, wherein heat was 
“knowingly exposed” to the curb and was detectible by a thermal 
imager.183  Similar to the infrared camera used in Kyllo, the 
technology used in FAST reveals medical information concerning a 
person that could only otherwise be obtained through a physical 
intrusion into a person’s body.  Like the infrared camera, which “sees” 
through the walls of the house, FAST’s sensors remotely gather, from 
a distance, a person’s vital signs.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a court 
would declare a FAST scan a non-search on the basis that the person 
“knowingly exposed” his or her vital signs for public viewing. 
B. FAST Scans Do Not Fall Under an Exception to the Warrant Requirement 
As a FAST scan is not an allowable binary search, and more likely 
an impermissible extrasensory search, it is unconstitutional unless 
one of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment applies.  Of the 
many exceptions to the warrant requirement, the administrative 
search exception is most applicable to a FAST scan because FAST is 
designed to find people with criminal intent attempting to enter 
                                                          
 179. Benson, supra note 59; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 39 n.6 (identifying the public 
availability of a technology as one factor in the Court’s analysis). 
 180. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 181. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[D]rug-detection dogs are highly 
trained tools of law enforcement, geared to respond in distinctive ways to specific 
scents so as to convey clear and reliable information to their human partners.  They 
are to the poodle down the street as high-powered binoculars are to a piece of plain 
glass.  Like the binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized device for 
discovering objects not in plain view (or plain smell).” (citation omitted)). 
 182. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 183. Supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text. 
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specific areas, similar to airport screening checkpoints.184  The federal 
courts of appeals have routinely held that airport security measures 
are administrative searches due to their routine nature and the high 
governmental interest in preventing terrorist bombings and 
hijackings of airplanes.185  Specifically, airport searches fall under the 
administrative search exception because their “primary goal is not to 
determine whether any passenger has committed a crime but rather 
to protect the public from a terrorist attack.”186  DHS has designed 
FAST to be implemented in airport security screens before using it in 
other operational scenarios.187  As FAST is designed primarily as a 
screening tool to prevent terrorism in secure locations, it would fall 
under the administrative exception, and its constitutionality would 
rest upon the reasonableness of the search it produces.188  However, if 
DHS were to employ FAST on the streets in an effort to prevent 
ordinary crimes, FAST falls out of the administrative search exception 
and must comply with ordinary Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
unless another exception applies.189 
The courts have noted that a search conducted under the 
administrative search exception must serve a purpose that is distinct 
from ordinary crime prevention.190  Once the government shows that 
                                                          
 184. See Gil, supra note 46, at 237, 246–47 (arguing that a field-test of the FAST 
system—MALINTENT—was valid as an administrative search or was valid as a non-
search investigatory stop). 
 185. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011) (emphasizing the government’s need to ensure public safety at airports); 
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring a substantial 
risk to public safety to allow suspicionless searches that go beyond the need for 
normal law enforcement); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(reasoning that although law enforcement does not typically detect weapons at 
airports, using a magnetometer to screen for weapons is a “reasonable search” given 
the “minimal invasion in all respects of a passenger’s privacy weighed against the great 
threat to hundreds of persons if a hijacker is able to proceed to the plane undetected”). 
 186. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10. 
 187. Supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (indicating that DHS has stated its 
intention to potentially deploy the system outside of airport checkpoints and in 
sporting venues and convention centers as well as on street corners). 
 188. See Gil, supra note 46, at 237. 
 189. For an analysis of FAST under other exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement, see id.  The analysis of FAST under other exceptions is outside 
of the scope of this Comment. 
 190. E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has never “indicate[d] approval of a[n] [administrative search] 
whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing”); 
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (“In the law of administrative 
searches . . . the government may not use an administrative inspection scheme to 
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its purpose is not ordinary law enforcement activities, the courts, 
when analyzing cases before them, employ a balancing test between 
(1) the governmental interest and (2) the invasion of an individual’s 
privacy interest.191 
1. Governmental interest 
To determine if an administrative search is valid, a court will weigh 
the governmental need for the search against the intrusion of 
personal privacy.  “[T]here must be a ‘substantial’ government 
interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the 
inspection is made . . . [and], the warrantless inspections must be 
‘necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.’”192  The regulatory 
scheme must also perform the functions of a warrant by giving those 
searched adequate notice and limiting the scope of the searching 
officers.193  Therefore, for there to be a valid governmental need:  (1) 
the government must have a special need; and (2) the search must 
further that regulatory scheme by (a) providing adequate notice, (b) 
limiting the scope of the search, and (c) being narrowly tailored to 
further the special need. 
a. Special need 
In order for an administrative search exception to be valid, the 
government must have a special interest distinct from law 
enforcement, meaning an interest that goes beyond solving ordinary 
crimes and that is unique to the situation.194  The Supreme Court has 
generally recognized that preventing terrorism is such an interest.  In 
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,195 the Court commented that 
preventing terrorism “would almost certainly” fall under the 
                                                          
search for criminal violations.”); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[A]s a threshold matter, the search must serve as its immediate purpose an 
objective distinct from the ordinary evidence gathering associated with crime 
investigation.” (quoting Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 2005))); 
United States v. Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the rule is 
“well established” that warrantless searches designed for purposes other than crime 
prevention may be permissible). 
 191. E.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10; United States v. Heckenkamp, 
482 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 
(2d Cir. 1974). 
 192. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702–03 (second alteration in original) (quoting Donovan 
v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600, 602 (1981)). 
 193. Id. at 703. 
 194. Supra Part I.B.1. 
 195. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
ROGERS.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  7:50 PM 
372 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:337 
administrative search exception.196  Multiple circuit courts have held 
further that terrorism definitely falls under the administrative 
search exception.197  However, these searches are unconstitutional 
when their primary purpose is to uncover evidence of “ordinary 
criminal wrongdoing.”198 
Although DHS contends that FAST is designed to deter terrorism 
at airports and border checkpoints, it is possible that DHS will 
expand the program to detect ordinary crimes before they are 
committed.199  Under this deployment, FAST would clearly violate the 
Court’s prohibition against allowing the administrative search 
exception for ordinary crime prevention.200 
A search is not an administrative search if its primary purpose is to 
assist law enforcement with the detection and prosecution of ordinary 
crimes.  However, a search that has an indirect or ancillary purpose of 
detecting ordinary crime can still qualify as an administrative search 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 44; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997) (“[W]here the 
risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated 
to the risk may rank as reasonable—for example, searches now routine at 
airports . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 
80–81 (2d Cir. 2006) (indicating that “the threat of terrorism is omnipresent” and 
that there is no clear limit to the government’s power to conduct searches under this 
justification, as well as upholding searches of ferry passengers’ luggage in the instant 
case); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 271 (2d Cir. 2006) (arguing that Edmond did 
not require the government to use checkpoint security for only an “imminent” 
terrorist attack and concluding that a search program to discover concealed 
explosives to protect mass transportation from terrorist attacks fell under the 
administrative search exception); cf. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1307, 1312–
13 (11th Cir. 2004) (refusing to expand the special needs doctrine to include 
searching for weapons at a protest site upon unfounded suspicion that radical groups 
were infiltrating the otherwise peaceful protest group). 
 197. See, e.g., Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171, 1179–80 (8th Cir. 
2014) (“The [magnetometers] at airport checkpoints are a reasonable administrative 
search because [of] the governmental interest in preventing terrorism . . . .”); Elec. 
Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(reviewing the various circuits that have held such); MacWade, 460 F.3d at 275 
(allowing suspicionless searches at subway entrances to deter terrorism); cf. Gil, supra 
note 46, at 248–49 (noting that the government has a significant interest in preventing 
terrorists from gaining access to government buildings, such as courthouses). 
 198. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41 (“We have never approved a checkpoint program 
whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”). 
 199. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
 200. But see United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding 
that the reporting of inadvertently discovered contraband in the course of an 
otherwise valid administrative search does not invalidate an administrative search). 
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and be reasonable if it passes the balancing test.201  In its current 
form, FAST is not designed to gather evidence; DHS specifically 
claims that FAST’s purpose is to identify suspects for additional 
screening.202  Even though FAST is designed to detect malintent, it is 
not designed to gather evidence for use in law enforcement 
proceedings.  Because the government’s need to prevent terrorism is 
significant, FAST is not a tool of ordinary law enforcement, at least with 
regard to airport screenings and other screenings to prevent terrorism. 
If DHS were to deploy FAST as a pre-crime detection program to 
prevent ordinary crimes, those searches would no longer be 
protected by the administrative search exception and would 
constitute an unconstitutional warrantless search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.203  As a pre-crime detection tool, FAST would 
not be permissible under Terry v. Ohio, which requires that law 
enforcement have reasonable suspicion that a person is armed and 
dangerous prior to searching the person.204  A search prior to this 
suspicion does not fall within the protection of Terry.205  FAST scans 
violate Terry because FAST scans search a person to obtain 
information about whether the person has malintent before reasonable 
suspicion arises.  However, the government could use FAST to detect 
acts of terrorism.206 
b. Furthering the regulatory scheme 
The second prong of the governmental reasonableness test 
requires that individuals have advance notice of the search and a 
chance to avoid it, that the search is limited in scope and duration, 
and that the search is narrowly tailored to detect the special 
governmental need.207 
                                                          
 201. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82–83 (2001) (disallowing 
drug testing of patients where the immediate objective was to gather evidence for law 
enforcement purposes). 
 202. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 203. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a 
city government’s argument that a search designed to enforce a criminal statute 
banning possession of dangerous items was independent of the city’s general interest 
in public safety and law enforcement because the purported distinction was 
“untenable”); supra note 106 (citing cases which note that the administrative search 
is only valid when its purpose is not to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing). 
 204. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1968). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Supra notes 201–02. 
 207. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702–03 (1987); MacWade v. Kelly, 460 
F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) requiring that an administrative search must be 
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i. Notice requirement 
Although FAST is not designed to give notice, the courts are likely 
to find that a reasonable person would expect to be searched at an 
airport and therefore would be on notice of a FAST search.  An 
administrative search is valid only if members of the public are aware 
that they will be searched and people are able to avoid the search by 
electing not to try to enter the secured area.208  The notice 
requirement requires that the person or place being searched in the 
administrative search context be “advise[d]” that she is being 
searched.209  Often, especially in the airport setting, passengers are 
intimately aware that they will be subject to a search once they enter a 
certain area, such as an airport security line.210  Given the increase in 
the quantity and scope of security regulations after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, it is “inconceivable” that airplane passengers 
are unaware that they must be searched before boarding airplanes.211  
Airport travelers have constructive notice that they will be subject to a 
form of search prior to boarding an aircraft.  People who choose not 
to be searched may do so by opting not to fly.212 
                                                          
“narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose,” be limited in duration, and provide notice 
of the search); United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); 
United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a screening 
search in an airport is reasonable if it is a good faith effort that is narrowly tailored to 
detect weapons or explosives and if passengers can avoid it by choosing not to fly). 
 208. See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960–62 (9th Cir. 2007) (arguing that 
by walking into a secured area of the airport, the respondent “subject[ed] himself to 
the airport screening process”).  Aukai relied on a federal statute that authorizes 
security screenings of passengers and noted that the “election occurs when a 
prospective passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items on the 
conveyor belt of the x-ray machine.”  Id. at 961.  See generally 49 U.S.C. § 44901 (2012) 
(requiring DHS to provide for screening of all people and cargo on passenger 
airplanes operating in interstate commerce). 
 209. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703.  The statutory program must perform the functions of 
a warrant, including notice and limiting the discretion of the searching officers.  Id. 
 210. Hartwell, 436 F.3d at 180–81 (“[A]ir passengers are on notice that they 
will be searched.”). 
 211. Id. at 181. 
 212. Id.; see also Burger, 482 U.S. at 711 (rationalizing in the context of a statute 
requiring vehicle inspections that the statute replaced the warrant notice 
requirement because it placed businesses subject to the statute on notice that they 
were subject to search); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. 
Auth., No. 04-11652-GAO, 2004 WL 1682859, at *3 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) (finding 
that since a transit authority gave the public notice that passengers on its trains and 
buses would be subject to searches, it adequately gave the public an option to avoid 
the searches by taking alternative routes to work). 
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The current design of FAST is to scan people before they enter a 
security zone.213  The main benefit of the pre-security screening is 
that people will not realize that they were being scanned.214  In United 
States v. Aukai,215 the Ninth Circuit was concerned that in a post-
September 11th world, allowing consent for screening would enable 
terrorists to test the system and just elect not to fly “on the cusp of 
detection” until a weakness in the security checkpoint system was 
found.216  The court refused to allow people to avoid being searched 
once they have started the security process, but the court declined to 
extend the power to the government to search people who had not 
yet attempted to go through security.217  The Ninth Circuit also 
rejected the government’s position that a person’s consent to be 
searched started upon entering the airport.218  As long as FAST is 
applied only to those who enter the security line—where a valid ticket 
is required—and not to those merely dropping passengers off, 
passengers will have notice that they will be searched once they are 
in a secure area. 
Constitutional issues would arise, however, if DHS proposed to use 
FAST beyond airport security screening and on the streets to detect 
ordinary crimes.  Airport screenings qualify as administrative searches 
only because their primary purpose is to protect the public from 
terrorist attacks rather than to detect ordinary crimes, and the notice 
requirement of a warrant is met because people constructively know 
that they will be searched when they fly.219  This notice prong would 
not be satisfied if FAST were used outside of places people expect to 
be searched—such as on the streets of their local towns. 
ii. Limited in scope 
A FAST scan is limited in scope because it takes only a few seconds 
to complete—less time than current airport security screenings—and 
officers have no discretion regarding who will be screened.  An 
                                                          
 213. Supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 214. Supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 215. 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 216. Id. at 960–61. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 961 n.9.  The court admitted that it may be possible for the government 
to argue that a person consented to a search merely by entering the airport facility, 
but that issue was not before the court at the time.  Id. at 961 n.8 (declining to 
speculate on whether the secure area “extend[s] from the airplane boarding gate to 
the street door”). 
 219. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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administrative search is reasonable only if it is also limited in duration 
and scope.220  The scope of an administrative search must be limited 
in its scope to reduce the fear and stigma associated with being 
singled out for screening.221  The courts have upheld administrative 
searches only when they do not detain suspects for an extended 
period of time and when the officers search everyone instead of 
arbitrarily searching individuals.222  When every passenger is 
searched, the searching officer has no discretion to choose who to 
search, which prevents the officer from using improper motives as 
the basis to search certain people.223  When the search does detain 
passengers for lengthy periods, the courts usually find that searches 
do not invade heavily on a person’s individual privacy and are 
therefore constitutional.224 
FAST easily satisfies the requirement that a search be limited in 
scope because the officers have no discretion in choosing whom to 
scan:  everyone is scanned upon entering the scan zone.225  Further, 
the system is designed to speed up the security process to a few 
                                                          
 220. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 497 (1983)) (finding that highway stops of motorists were not 
presumptively unconstitutional when the stops were brief and merely asked the 
individuals stopped to help apprehend a fugitive). 
 221. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559–60 (1976) 
(expounding that routine checkpoint vehicle searches are minimally intrusive 
when the stopping officer stops every car that passes through the checkpoint); 
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (characterizing searches by 
uniformed officers “out in the open” as ones that are minimally intrusive because 
they do not make people fear additional screenings); United States v. Hartwell, 436 
F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Since every air passenger is subjected to a search, 
there is virtually no ‘stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known, 
designated airport search point.’” (quoting United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 
1275 (5th Cir. 1973))). 
 222. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–53 (1990) 
(sobriety checkpoints); Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962–63 (airport searches); MacWade, 460 
F.3d at 273 (subway searches). 
 223. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., No. 04-
11652-GAO, 2004 WL 1682859, at *4 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) (approving of a 
searching scheme in a mass transit system where all bus and train riders were subject 
to search once they entered a secure zone). 
 224. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 448 (finding that a twenty-five-second sobriety checkpoint 
stop is minimally intrusive); Aukai, 497 F.3d at 963 (reasoning that although an 
eighteen minute airport security screen was “longer” than screenings in other 
situations, the length was appropriate to determine whether the individual subject to 
the search was carrying weapons or other contraband). 
 225. See DHS FAST PRESENTATION, supra note 6, at 2 (indicating that DHS 
designed FAST to increase the speed of security screenings while minimizing the 
effect on passengers).  The system would not work unless every person was scanned. 
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seconds, eventually reducing the time burden to no detention at 
all.226  Therefore, FAST is appropriately limited in the scope of its 
scans and meets this requirement. 
iii. Narrowly tailored 
FAST is not narrowly tailored to prevent terrorist activities because 
it is possible that it can be circumvented if a person is unaware that a 
crime is being committed or even believes that the act being taken is 
a not crime.  An administrative search is narrowly tailored so long as 
it “is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of 
current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or 
explosives . . . [and] is confined in good faith to that purpose.”227  
However, it does not need to be the least intrusive measure 
possible.228  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit held that the need to protect the public from airplane 
hijackings is “particularly acute” and implied that any measures to 
detect and deter attempts to carry explosives aboard a plane would be 
allowed.229  However, the court still noted that to use the millimeter 
wave scanner at a checkpoint, it must be designed to “deter[] attempts 
to carry aboard airplanes explosives in liquid or powder form.”230 
FAST is designed to detect malintent—not explosives or weapons.  
Unlike magnetometers, which inform security officials of the 
presence or absence of metallic objects (a binary search), FAST does 
neither:  FAST cannot detect weapons or explosives but can detect 
only the intent to commit a crime.231  Further, FAST cannot 
distinguish between intent to commit a terrorist action and intent to 
commit a garden-variety crime.  Therefore, FAST does not satisfy the 
                                                          
 226. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 227. Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 228. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 
746, 763 (2010)). 
 229. Id. (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000)). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See supra notes 6, 57 and accompanying text (defining “malintent” as intent 
to commit a crime); see also Gregg Henriques, Attributions of Malintent:  A Dangerous 
Form of Attribution, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 7, 2013), http://www.psychologytoday. 
com/blog/theory-knowledge/201304/attributions-malintent (defining “malintent” 
as “having harmful or malicious intent”). 
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Supreme Court’s requirement that administrative searches have a 
unique government need apart from ordinary law enforcement.232 
However, having the intent to commit a crime, without more, does 
not provide enough for law enforcement to act.233  Although DHS has 
not released specific information on the results of its FAST tests, it is 
likely that the detection of malintent would show equally a person 
intending to commit a terrorist attack and a drug courier—the 
former falling under the special needs exception, and the latter 
falling under ordinary crime prevention. 
Critics are concerned that FAST could mistakenly flag a person 
who was flying to see a paramour, despite DHS’s assertions that this 
would be impossible.234  Further, unlike backscatter or millimeter 
wave technology235 that can detect items of any composition hidden 
against the body, FAST can do neither if a suspect’s state of mind 
lacks malintent.236  The detection of a state of mind is not tailored to 
further the regulatory scheme of preventing acts of terrorism; rather, 
it could detect the routine crime of drug smuggling and possibly the 
                                                          
 232. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38 (explaining that the Court has never approved of 
administrative searches used for detecting ordinary crimes); see also New York v. Burger, 
482 U.S. 691, 724 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing precedent for this requirement). 
 233. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that a person does not 
commit a crime by merely having a guilty thought). 
 234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (expounding that DHS could find 
evidence of malintent where an individual has no criminal aspirations and instead 
has guilty thoughts for purposes independent of criminal intent). 
 235. Backscatter scanners, which are no longer used in airports, send scattered x-
rays at a person and are able to provide high resolution images of a person in their 
nude form.  Whole Body Imaging Technology and Body Scanners (“Backscatter” X-Ray and 
Millimeter Wave Screening), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CENTER, http://epic.org/ 
privacy/airtravel/backscatter (last visited Dec. 21, 2014).  Active millimeter wave 
technology scanners (the chamber that spins two antenna panels around the 
scannee), which are actively used in airports, use microwaves or ionizing radiation to 
reflect off a person, enabling security officials to construct a three-dimensional image 
of the scannee and see any shapes on the body that do not belong.  Assessment of 
Checkpoint Security:  Are Our Airports Keeping Passengers Safe?  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Transp. Sec. & Infrastructure Prot. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 74 
(2010) (statement of Mitchel J. Laskey, President and CEO, Brijot Imaging Systems, 
Inc.).  A newly developed passive millimeter wave technology merely measures the 
naturally emitted millimeter waves from the body and detects objects that obstruct 
those waves.  Id.  This project is in use in foreign countries but still under testing as 
of 2010 in the United States.  Id. 
 236. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (highlighting that millimeter wave scanners can deter terrorists 
from bringing explosives in liquid or powder form onto airplanes); see also supra note 
46 and accompanying text (distinguishing between a FAST scan that detects 
malintent and a metal detector that detects the physical presence of a metal object). 
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arguably legal act of cheating on one’s spouse.237  Since FAST only 
detects malintent, it would theoretically not work if a person was 
unknowingly carrying a concealed bomb into a secured area, allowing 
the program to be circumvented.  It is also unclear whether FAST 
could detect a terrorist who thought that he was justified in his 
actions and therefore not committing a crime.238  As such, the FAST 
system is not narrowly designed to further the regulatory scheme of 
preventing acts of terrorism since its primary purpose is to scan a 
person’s mind for potential criminal mens rea.239  Also, it is 
ineffective at detecting and deterring attempted terrorist attacks.  
Therefore, FAST is not narrowly tailored to the government’s 
purpose of preventing terrorist acts and fails this part of the 
administrative search requirement.240 
2. Intrusion of personal privacy 
Administrative searches must be balanced between the 
governmental need for the search and the search’s intrusion upon a 
                                                          
 237. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (comparing critics’ concerns 
that the system is not narrowly tailored to DHS’s statement that FAST sensors can 
distinguish between malintent and mere anxiety).  Although adultery technically 
remains illegal in twenty-one states, Jolie Lee, New Hampshire Senate Votes to Repeal 
Anti-Adultery Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014, 4:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation-now/2014/04/17/anti-adultery-laws-new-hampshire/7780563, it 
is now rarely enforced after the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003), as shown with the recent admission by General David Petraeus, 
who admitted to an adulterous relationship in Virginia where adultery remains a 
criminal offense, Ethan Bronner, Mass. Among 23 States Where Adultery Is a Crime, 
but Rarely Prosecuted, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
news/nation/2012/11/15/adultery-still-crime-states-including-mass/KiIPGRcFnAe 
T4CGmenFTKM/story.html. 
 238. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (emphasizing that malintent 
encompasses intent to commit a crime, which may be lacking in terrorists who do not 
believe their activities are criminal in nature). 
 239. See supra notes 231–32 and accompanying text.  Proponents are likely to 
argue that the millimeter wave scanners similarly can detect ordinary criminal 
activity, such as attempts to smuggle drugs tapped to the body.  However, courts have 
emphasized that searches must be designed in “good faith” to further the regulatory 
scheme.  See United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).  However, by 
the definition of “malintent,” FAST is designed to detect a criminal mindset, not one 
of terrorism, and therefore is not tailored to further the regulatory scheme.  See supra 
notes 6, 199–201 and accompanying text. 
 240. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that 
administrative searches must have a “good faith” purpose of detecting and preventing 
the special need (quoting United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972)). 
ROGERS.OFF.TO.WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/3/2015  7:50 PM 
380 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:337 
person’s individual privacy.241  A person has a heighted privacy 
interest in his or her person and medical records, even when a third 
party holds those records.242  Although the remoteness of the FAST 
scan make it minimally intrusive, the appropriate test is not how 
physically intrusive the scan is but, rather, how much private 
information is revealed.243  Generally, when a governmental request 
requires disclosure of a person’s medical records, the request is 
allowed when there is a governmental need for the medical records 
themselves.244  The courts have rarely looked at situations when the 
government directly obtained medical information from a person, 
the few situations being for blood tests following a driving under the 
influence arrest.245  Even in McNeely, the Supreme Court held that a 
warrant was required before the police could perform a 
nonconsensual blood test to determine an arrestee’s blood alcohol 
content even though alcohol metabolizes in the blood over time.246  A 
straight blood test, which is able to obtain the complete information 
obtained in a blood sample, is more similar to a FAST search that can 
obtain all the information of a vital signs scan.  As such, a FAST scan 
should trigger the same heightened privacy interests as other tests 
that can discover medical data, similar to McNeely.247  Therefore, a 
FAST scan would intrude on a person’s heightened privacy rights. 
The Court has required a warrant to obtain medical evidence even 
when a traditional exception to the warrant requirement might 
otherwise apply.248  The one time that the Supreme Court allowed a 
warrantless medical test that used DNA swabs, it did so because of the 
                                                          
 241. Supra note 191 and accompanying text (explaining that courts balance the 
governmental interest against the individual’s privacy interest when determining if 
an administrative search is reasonable). 
 242. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 443, 449–51 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
a law enforcement officer violated the petitioner’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his patient records at a methadone clinic where the officer searched the records in 
the clinic file room without a warrant); see supra Part I.C (detailing that individuals 
have a heightened privacy interest in personal medical information). 
 243. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 38 (2001). 
 244. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598, 602 (1977) (finding that the State of 
New York had a vital interest in controlling the distribution of Schedule II narcotics and 
therefore could request doctors provide the State with narcotics prescription records). 
 245. See, e.g., Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1556 (2013) (rejecting the 
opportunity to create a per se exigency exception to the warrant requirement for 
nonconsensual blood testing in drunk driving cases). 
 246. Id. at 1560–61. 
 247. Supra notes 127–38. 
 248. Supra Part I.C.2 (underscoring that medical information is highly sensitive 
and thus highly private). 
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practical concerns of solving crimes rather than the given reason of 
an administrative booking.249  Even though an arrestee had a minimal 
expectation of privacy in a DNA swab, the Court specifically noted 
that the test would not be able to obtain any medical information 
from the swab other than a person’s identity since the swab only 
obtained noncoding DNA sequences.250  However, no court has 
addressed the mass gathering of medical information under the 
administrative search exception.251 
A FAST scan operates by revealing medical data directly from the 
scannee.252  Since the question of the government obtaining medical 
data generally falls outside of the bounds of normal exceptions to the 
warrant requirement, courts will likely scrutinize the FAST program 
and the data obtained through it under a Fourth Amendment 
analysis.253  Typically, medical data has heightened protections but 
can be requested by the government only when there is a compelling 
governmental need for the medical records and proper protection of 
those records.254  Similarly, the government has no need for the 
medical data that it is obtained from a FAST scan beyond the need to 
aggregate the data to predict the scannee’s state of mind.  The 
government would obtain mass medical information on everyone 
who is scanned instead of information pertaining to specific 
individuals or health concerns. 
Additionally, FAST identifies people for further screening only to 
determine if the person poses a threat.  The U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia in Klayman held that the NSA’s mass 
collection of private information infringed upon the privacy interests 
of telephone users despite the national security concerns expressed 
                                                          
 249. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970–71 (2013) (explaining that an 
officer should know a suspect’s criminal history during routine booking). 
 250. Id. at 1979.  See generally supra note 139 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in King). 
 251. Recently, however, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
addressed the Fourth Amendment implications of an NSA program that mass collected 
phone metadata from the public.  See infra notes 255–58 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 118–26, 167 and accompanying text (noting that the sensor 
packages on FAST can obtain sensitive medical information on the scannee). 
 253. See supra notes 118–26 and accompanying text. 
 254. Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450–51 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no need 
existed when a law enforcement officer searched methadone treatment records to 
find a suspect for a jewelry heist); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dir. of Nat’l Inst. for 
Occupational Safety & Health, 636 F.2d 163, 165–66 (6th Cir. 1980) (allowing 
government access to records when there was a governmental need to research factory 
safety conditions and the government could properly protect the records it accessed). 
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by the government.255  The court downplayed the national security 
issues because the government could not provide any example of 
where it had identified a terrorist using anything other than 
traditional investigative means.256 
Similarly, FAST will only identify suspects for further screening and 
will not independently prevent airplane hijackings.257  FAST is merely 
a tool to indicate whether people should be screened further—the 
government must still identify threats through subsequent traditional 
measures.258  Therefore, under the Klayman analysis, FAST’s invasion 
of individuals’ privacy interests would outweigh the governmental 
interest in preventing terrorism since FAST would not detect terrorist 
attempts but would merely identify people for further screening.259 
Courts have condoned the use of intrusive technology when the 
technique is narrowly tailored to the regulatory scheme and adequate 
safeguards are taken.  In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. 
Department of Homeland Security,260 the D.C. Circuit analyzed the 
implications of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
employing Advanced Imaging Technology (“AIT”) (millimeter wave 
and backscatter scanners) at airport screenings, which originally 
displayed images of a scannee’s nude body.261  The court held that 
these scans were not too intrusive:  passengers could opt for a pat 
down instead of the scan, and the scannee’s privacy was protected 
because the images produced were distorted and would 
subsequently be deleted.262 
Currently, DHS has not explained how FAST data would be 
protected.263  To protect a person’s privacy, DHS would have to 
ensure that the information obtained through a FAST scan cannot be 
retained in any manner and that the data cannot be linked to an 
identifiable person during the scan, similar to the testing 
                                                          
 255. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 256. Id. at 40. 
 257. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (identifying that FAST only 
identifies people for additional screening). 
 258. Supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text. 
 259. Supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 260. 653 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 261. Id. at 10–11. 
 262. Id. at 10.  The court did not address whether using AIT was a “virtual strip 
search” in violation of Islamic beliefs against revealing a person’s nude body because 
such a person was not properly before the court.  Id. at 9. 
 263. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
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procedures.264  The data would further need to be deleted after the 
determination of malintent was made, which is more difficult than 
the AIT image since FAST must aggregate data from different scans 
and compare it against the scannee’s baseline.265  Although DHS 
claims that each scannee develops his or her own baseline,266 DHS 
cannot retain scans to develop a community baseline to which 
scannees are compared, as retention of data would not protect the 
scannee’s privacy interest. 
FAST’s invasion of personal privacy will not outweigh the 
government’s need to prevent terrorism.  The Supreme Court has 
noted that individuals have a heightened interest in their medical 
records, and lower courts have held that the mass gathering on data 
must directly serve the governmental need.  FAST does neither.  
Instead, FAST directly obtains medical data from scannees and 
because it has a low accuracy rate and could be easily circumvented, it 
is not effective at detecting terrorist activities.  Any detection of 
terrorist attempts, even with FAST, will still be done by the already 
highly effective screening techniques employed today.  As such, even 
if the government met its requirements under the administrative 
search exception, the invasion of personal privacy outweighs the 
governmental need, rendering FAST unreasonable under the 
administrative search exception. 
CONCLUSION 
FAST is a system that is designed to scan the body’s vital signs and, 
based on the aggregate data, to determine whether a person has 
malintent—the intent to commit a crime.  Although FAST is 
currently in the developmental phase, DHS intends to deploy the 
system to airports, border crossings, and potentially in high risk 
areas, such as stadiums.  FAST is a pre-screening tool:  its purpose is 
merely to identify individuals to be subjected to more rigorous 
screening techniques, and by itself, FAST is not able to provide 
probable cause for an arrest. 
                                                          
 264. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text; see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 
653 F.3d at 10 (determining that TSA has taken precautions to protect an 
individual’s privacy in the context of AIT, such as distorting the product of an AIT 
scan and deleting it as soon as the individual has been cleared and permitting 
passengers to opt-out of an AIT scan and elect the traditional pat down instead). 
 265. Cf. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10 (highlighting TSA’s privacy measures 
of deleting the images created by the millimeter wave scanners). 
 266. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text. 
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In the terrorism context, the governmental interest must be 
weighed against an individual’s right to privacy.  FAST scans implicate 
two privacy interests:  personal medical data, to which the Supreme 
Court has given heightened protection, and mass data collection, an 
act which some courts suggest violates the Fourth Amendment. 
However, FAST scans will not violate the Fourth Amendment if the 
government uses certain safeguards:  (1) the person subject to the 
scan is on notice that the scan it about to take place, (2) the scan is 
limited in scope, and (3) the scan is narrowly tailored to advance the 
governmental interest.  If a FAST scan meets these requirements—
such as by only being used at airports when there is viable 
intelligence that a specific flight will be targeted by terrorism, by 
placing those on notice seeking to be on that flight that they are 
subject to behavioral scanning, and by limiting its use to only those 
who seek to board the flight—then the search may be reasonable.  
However, due to the secrecy surrounding FAST, it is unclear whether 
DHS will limit FAST in such a way. 
If DHS were to deploy the system in cities to detect crimes before 
the crimes are committed, it would place FAST outside of the 
administrative search exception and into the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment.  The government may use a search method 
that is more intrusive than another method as long as the method 
chosen is minimally intrusive under a Fourth Amendment analysis.  
Currently, the traditional screening methods are effective, as 
evidenced by the scarcity of terrorist acts conducted on airplanes, and 
to satisfy the requirements of warrantless searches, FAST itself must 
be instrumental in deterring or preventing terrorist attacks.  The 
program is also not narrowly tailored to detect terrorism because it is 
designed to detect malintent, which could range from covertly visiting 
one’s paramour, to drug smuggling or terrorism.  As such, the program 
is not narrowly tailored to the regulatory scheme that it is promoting. 
Having “malintent” is not a crime itself, as thoughts alone are not 
crimes until there is some action upon them.  In 1949, George Orwell 
feared that the government would detect and punish thought-crime 
by 1984; Orwell was prescient in his prediction, as the Department 
of Homeland Security is currently developing a system to detect 
such thoughts.  Fortunately, the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
Fourth Amendment in a way that would prevent the government 
from employing such a system and lead the United States into an 
Orwellian future. 
